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Abstract
Enabled by the development of information technologies, telecommuting and telework
have been incorporated into organizations for around 30 years. However, there still exists
resistance to this work arrangement, particularly from middle-level managers. Formal
knowledge about how to manage telework is needed to keep the managers better
informed. I conducted a qualitative exploratory study to investigate how managers
exercise controls in the telework environment and examined the role of the use of
information technologies in organizational controls in this work environment. Based on
interview data with people from two work groups that participate in telework program, I
found that the managers exercise a portfolio of controls that consist all four documented
control forms (outcome, behavior, clan and self control), and controlling the employees’
adoption and use of information technologies is a new form of behavior control in the
telework environment.
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1

Introduction
The term “telecommuting” was coined about 30 years ago to refer to the

phenomenon that employees can access information in the workplace through
technologies without physically being in the workplace (Nilles 1994). Telework refers to
work that is done through telecommuting. Enabled by the development of information
technologies and driven by the knowledge economy and global business competition,
more and more organizations start to incorporate telework into their organization design.
According to a WorldatWork group report in 2006, the number of Americans whose
employer allows them to work from home at least one day per month increased from 7.6
million in 2004, to 9.9 million in 2005, and to 12.4 million in 2006. The United States
Bureau of Transportation Services in 2006 showed that 30 percent of the US labor force
work at home at least part of the week (Mello 2007).
Telework

brings

environmental

and

societal

benefits

thanks

toreduced

commuting. In addition, telework brings benefits to both the employers and the
employees. For the employers, the benefits include increased employee productivity,
enhanced customer and client service, reduced operation cost, improved resilience to
unexpected circumstances, and increased recruitment options. For the employees,
Telework leads to a better quality of life, more flexible work schedules, and reduced
transportation costs and travel durations (Khaifa and Davidson 2000).
Despite the benefits of Telework listed above, there are still challenges to
implement a successful telework program. There is even resistance to telework from
many companies (Khaifa and Davidson 2000; Baker, Avery and Crawford 2006). For
example, in 2006, HP pulled telecommuting IT staff back to offices (Thibodeau 2006).
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With the development of information technologies, technologies no longer restrict
Telework, and the major challenge lies on the management side (Baker, Avery et al.
2006).
One of the significant challenges to implement a successful telework program lies
in the management of telework. It is found that some managers are resistant to change
and hesitant to change managerial practices. Some managers stick to the old management
practices of managing by walking around (Mears 2007) and still have the traditional
managerial attitude that workers need to be seen to be considered working (Lupton and
Haynes 2000).
The hesitance and suspicion of telework in practitioners is affected by the lack of
formal knowledge about managerial controls in telework (Jessup and Robey 2002). The
following questions remain unanswered. When the cost of physically monitoring mobile
and distributed workforce becomes high, how will management adapt their controls? Will
management simply rely on output control rather than evaluate work behaviors and
presence? Will management evaluate work based on the digital trace of the work created
by information technologies? Will management engage in compulsive monitoring with
the help of anytime/anywhere access? Or will managers encourage and facilitate
employees to engage in self-control behaviors? Answers to these questions are of great
practical value to management in organizations implementing telework programs.
Besides practical implications, answers to the above questions are of great value
to advancing our understanding of theories of organizational controls, which very likely
need to be changed or adapted for the telework environment. Telework loosens the spatial
and temporal constraints of work, separates managers and employees to some degree, and
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redefines the notion of “work” and “workplace”. Traditional control theories may not
directly apply, and thus need to be re-evaluated, elaborated and updated.
Moreover,

Orlikowski

and

Barley

(2001)

comment

that

literatures

on

telecommuting either focus on organizational and institutional issues of telecommuting
but neglect technology advancement, or emphasize innovation enabling information
technologies but ignore organizational issues. They call for more research on the issue of
telecommuting to incorporate both organization theory and the use of information
technologies. Prior studies have shown that the adoption and use of information
technologies can have impact on organizational controls (Orlikowski 1991). In telework,
using information technologies is an essential part of work because the employees rely on
these technologies to work and communicate. Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore the
relationship between information technology use and organizational controls. Will the
employers control the employees’ use of technologies? Will using technologies become
part of the control process? We intend to answer these questions in this research.
In summary, telework has become increasingly popular in today’s organizations.
In order for the telework program to benefit both the employers and the employees,
managers of teleworking employees need to implement effective organizational controls.
Traditional organizational theories do not directly apply because telework changes the
organizational environment. Therefore, we plan to conduct a study to explore the control
issues in telework. Specially, we intend to answer the following two questions:
1) How do organizational controls operate in the telework environment?
2) What is the relationship between organizational controls and the use of
information technologies in the telework environment?
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In order to answer these two research questions, I conducted a qualitative empirical
study and develop a theoretical account about the organizational controls in telework to
further elaborate and extend organizational control theories.

2

Literature Review
Because the focus of the study is organizational controls in telework

environments, I draw on control theories in organization studies as our theoretical basis. I
discuss the concept of control; review three dominant theoretical views about control;
discuss self-control as an alternative control method; summarize the recent development
in control theory regarding control portfolios; and review the research in information
systems on controls. Moreover, I describe two critical perspectives on controls,
disciplinary power and the dialectic of control.
2.1

The Concept of Control
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary defines that “to control” means “to exercise

restraining or directing influence over: regulate.” In organization studies, theories on
controls are studied from classical, modern, symbolic-interpretive, and postmodern
perspectives (Hatch 1997). In the organization theory, organizational control has been
interpreted in various ways. The dominant view is from Tannenbaum, who regarded
control as the sum of interpersonal influence relations in an organization (Tannenbaum
1968). He stated:
“Organization implies control. A social organization is an ordered arrangement of
individual human interactions. Control processes help circumscribe idiosyncratic
behaviors and keep them conformant to the rational plan of the organization.
Organizations require a certain amount of conformity as well as the integration of
diverse activities. It is the function of control to bring about conformance to
organization requirements and achievement of the ultimate purpose of the
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organization. The coordination and order out of the diverse interests and
potentially diffuse behaviors of members is largely a function of control.”
(Tannenbaum 1968, page 3)

The basic assumption underlying control theory is that individuals participating in
an organization have divergent interests and goals. It is likely that these divergent
interests and goals are incongruent with the organization’s goal. Therefore, in order to
ensure that organizational members work dependably, organizations need to implement
controls to direct individual efforts to meet the organization’s goal (Ouchi 1979; Ouchi
1980). Control can be applied to different levels, such as individuals and groups.
2.2

The Cybernetic Model of Control
One way to conceptualize a control system is to perceive it as a cybernetic system

(Beer 1959; Green and Welsh 1988). In cybernetics, the current state of a system is
compared against the desired state, and an adjustment is made if any discrepancy between
the two is detected. For example, a thermostat is designed to compare the current room
temperature with the desired temperature and turn the heating/cooling unit on or off
depending on the difference between the current and desired temperatures (Hatch 1997).
In a cybernetic control system, organizations first set up targets or standards of
acceptable

behaviors

and/or

outputs

according

to

organizational

goals.

Then

organizations monitor work tasks conducted by employees. Organizations evaluate
behaviors and/or outputs of employees based on the target or standard, and then provide
feedback to employees. If an employee’s behavior or output deviates from the standards,
the organization will take the corrective measure to adjust the employees’ actions.
Sometimes if the deviation is due to unfair standards, the organization will also revise the
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standards. The focus of the control system is performance evaluation and feedback
systems on work tasks (Robey and Sales 1994; Hatch 1997).
According to the contents of the target or standard, the control system can be
categorized as output or behavior control. These two types of controls are often
categorized as formal controls (Kirsh 1996). Output control focuses on the result of task
activity and relies on the measurement of task output. In organizations using output
control, output needs to have high measurability and should be easily associated with
either individuals or groups (Ouchi 1979; Hatch 1997). When these two conditions do not
apply, organizations can use behavior control, in which behaviors that are associated with
high performance are identified and established as targets or standards. In organizations
using behavior control, the task observablility needs to be high, meaning that the process
of transforming from input to output needs to be well-understood by organizations (Ouchi
1979; Hatch 1997; Turner and Makhija 2006). When both output measurability and task
observability are low, organizations will have difficulty with both behavior and outcome
controls (Hatch 1997). One typical case is creative and innovative work, in which output
is too unique to make comparisons to a standard, and the behaviors rendering good
performance are hard to define (Robey and Sales 1994).
2.3

Agency Theory
Agency theory conceptualizes the control problem around the relationship

between organization’s owners (called principals), and managers (called agents).
Managers are perceived as agents because they are expected to act in the principals’
interests rather than their own when making decisions on behalf of the principal. An
agency problem refers to the risk that managers will serve their own interest rather than
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their principal’s. Agency theories focus on ways to control the agents’ self-serving
behaviors and assure the interests of the principals (Ross 1973). Although agency
theorists form their theories in terms of the relationships between organizations’ owners
and top management, the theory can be generalized to lower levels of management and
their subordinates (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt 1985).
In agency theory, contracts are used to align the agents’ self-interests with the
interests of their principals (Eisenhardt 1985; Hatch 1997). Contracts specify measures
and promise rewards so that agents’ own interests are served when they fulfill the
demands of the contracts. Through the contract, principals delegate work to their agents
for an agreed price, and their divergent interests are aligned. When principals are not or
cannot be continuously present, they are open to opportunism by agents who may not
perform as agreed, that is, they may shirk (Hatch 1997).
In agency theory, principals rely on information to know whether their agents are
shirking. Complete information means that the principals know exactly whether the
agents are performing to the specification of the contract, while incomplete information
means that they do not know exactly. If the principals’ information is incomplete, agents
may have temptation to shirk. Although direct observation can provide complete
information, it takes time and effort and principals cannot do so because the monitoring
costs are too high. To deal with incomplete information situations, the principals have
two options. They can either purchase surveillance mechanisms, or they can reward their
agents based on outcomes instead of behaviors (Eisenhardt 1985; Hatch 1997).
From the perspective of agency theory, the issue of whether to use behavior or
outcome control is a matter of the costs associated with collecting the information
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required to minimize the chance that the agents will shirk (Eisenhardt 1985; Hatch 1997).
Behavior controls require surveillance mechanisms and information systems. When tasks
are non-routine, such mechanisms and systems are difficult to build. Output control is
less costly if the output can be easily measured. Since outcome not only depends on the
agents’ behaviors but also depends on the conditions in the environment. When agents
are under outcome control, they share the uncontrollable risk with the principals (Hatch
1997).
2.4
2.4.1

Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans
Three Sources of Controls
Ouchi (1979; 1980) conceptualizes three distinguishable sources of control

mechanisms: markets, bureaucracies and clans. Organizations that implement market
control use price competition as a control mechanism. Profit centers are created within a
multi-divisional organization, and outputs from one subdivision are transferred to the
next based on internal “transfer price” (Hatch 1997). Organizations that implement
bureaucracy control rely on rules, procedures, documentations, and surveillance as
control. They make rules about either the standards of task process or the quantity and
quality of the task output, and provide supervisors authority to exercise close personal
surveillance

and

direction

over

subordinates.

Organizations

that

implement

clan

mechanisms facilitate their employees to obtain high internal commitment to the firm’s
objective, cultures, norms, and values mainly through the employee selection, promotion,
and socialization processes. In clan control, explicit surveillance and evaluations can be
removed because employees internalize the organization’s goal. Socialization between
organization members is essential in the internalization process. Ouchi (1979; 1980)
12

observes that all organizations exercise a combination of the three control strategies, but
each organization favors one strategy over the other two.
Ouchi (1979) discusses the social and informational requirements for the three
sources of controls. The social requirement for market control is the norm of reciprocity,
meaning that both parties involved in a transaction should be honest with each other and
understand that cheating behaviors will lead to severe punishment. Without the norm of
reciprocity, cheating behaviors will elevate the cost of transactions and eventually lead to
market failure. The social requirement for bureaucratic control includes legitimate
authority in addition to the norm of reciprocity. Under bureaucratic control, employees
work in exchange for salary as those under market control. Furthermore, they also agree
to give up part of their autonomy and legitimately allow their supervisors to monitor and
direct their work activities. Clan control has the strictest social requirements. It not only
requires the norm of reciprocity and legitimate authority, but also requires agreement on
values and beliefs.

In clan control, there are no explicit price mechanisms or explicit

rules and procedures. It requires an implicit agreement about the proper behaviors and
high level commitment to those socially prescribed behaviors.
Among the three controls, clan control is the most demanding and market control
is the least demanding in terms of the social requirements. However, the opposite is true
in terms of the informational requirements. In market control, internal transfer prices
need to be provided to support the transactions between departments within a single
organization. Explicit information systems such as accounting information systems and
other implicit information systems are demanded to provide the transfer prices
information. In reality, because of technological interdependence and uncertainty,

13

arriving at a transfer price is not always feasible. Thus organizations will implement
bureaucratic control, creating explicit sets of rules to establish standards about behaviors
and output.

Organizations implementing bureaucratic control need to create rules and

communicate these rules to their employees, and they need information systems to
monitor, evaluate and provide feedback to employees. In clan control, information is
contained in the rituals, stories, and ceremonies, and it does not require a large staff of
accounting and information systems experts to create and maintain complex information
systems for the purpose of control. However, the information about values and norms is
subtle, meaning that it cannot be easily obtained by newcomers. Therefore, socialization
between employees is essential in clan control.
Ouchi (1979) outlines the relationship between forms of commitment and the
three types of control. He points out that the commitment levels are high for both market
and clan control. Under market control, employees internalize that they work toward their
self-interests; under clan control, employees internalize the organizational goals and are
even willing to sacrifice their self-interests. The employee commitment level is low under
bureaucratic control. Employees can accept their supervisors’ monitoring, direction and
advice without internalization. In other words, compliance is the minimum commitment
level required. However, a control heavily depending on explicit monitoring, evaluation,
and feedback has the risk of offending people’s sense of autonomy and of self-control.
Costs involved in the three different types of controls vary. Market control carries
low cost for searching and selecting employees and low cost of monitoring and
surveillance. Market control works well when people work for their self-interest, so the
requirements for selecting employees do not have to be very restrictive. There is little
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monitoring and surveillance so the cost is low. However, market control bears high cost
of information system in order to provide transfer price information. In bureaucratic
control, the cost of searching for and selecting people is low. Once people get employed,
they receive intensive training and monitoring and direction from their supervisors.
However, the cost of developing and running a supervisory system to monitor, evaluate,
and correct people behaviors is high. In clan control, it is critical to select the right people
into the organization, so it bears high cost of searching for and selecting people as well as
socializing people. Because clan control depends on people’s willingness to conform to
organization goals rather than on explicit monitoring and surveillance system, the cost of
bureaucracy is low while the cost of facilitating people’s internalization of organization’s
objectives, culture, and beliefs is high.
2.4.2

Concertive Control: An Exemplar of Clan Control
One exemplar of clan control is concertive control in self-managing teams.

Concertive control refers to notion that workers control themselves by collaborating to
develop their own control (Tompskins and Cheney 1985; Barker 1993). In the process of
establishing and exercising concertive control, first workers interact and reach a
negotiated consensus about proper behaviors. They do so by internalizing a set of core
values of their organizations, such as those found in their corporate vision. Subsequently,
this negotiated consensus produces and reproduces value-based discourse among
workers, and normative rules emerge. Next, workers within a work team follow these
rationalized normative rules to reward proper behaviors and sanction inappropriate ones.
Thus, workers behave within the parameters of the value systems and the discourse that
they generate (Barker 1993).
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The key difference between concertive control and bureaucratic control is the
locus of the authority - the legitimate source of control. Under a bureaucratic system,
rational rules are created and maintained by supervisors. Under concertive control, they
come from the value consensus of the group’s or the organization’s members (Barker
1993). The successful implementation of concertive control requires a high level of
collaboration and high degree of self-management. This form of control is probably less
apparent but more powerful because every team member, not just the supervisor, can
assume the controller’s role.
2.4.3

The Rise of Community Governance in the Knowledge Economy
Adler (2001) argues that recent conceptualization of trends in organization forms

overemphasizes the importance of markets, hierarchies, and hybrid intermediate forms of
these two, while ignoring a third type of organization and its coordination mechanism –
the community form of organization with trust as coordination mechanism. Different
institutions combine the three organization forms/coordination mechanisms in different
proportions. Furthermore, he argues that as the economy becomes more knowledge
intensive, it is expected that high-trust institutional forms will proliferate and be more
effective than market and hierarchy forms of organizations.
The community form of organization is an informal organization that constitutes
its members as a community. In community organizations, trust is the key coordinating
mechanism. In short, trust is confidence in another’s goodwill. Moreover, Adler argues
that the most effective form of trust is reflective trust rather than traditionalistic, “blind”
trust. With three types of coordination mechanisms, market/price, bureaucracy/hierarchy,
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and community/trust, institutions can be mapped in three dimensions according to their
salience of the different coordination mechanisms.
In addition, Adler (2001) hypothesizes that as our economy grows more
knowledge-intensive, community/trust becomes a more effective means of organizational
governance than market/price and bureaucracy/hierarchy. In today’s economy, as the
educational level of the workforce rises and the scientific and technical knowledge
represented in equipment and products grows, knowledge creation and dissemination
become critical activities within and across organizations.
The “public good” nature of knowledge determines that market/price and
bureaucracy/hierarchy are not as effective as community/trust. In the market form of
organization, price mechanism is used to optimize the production and allocation of
products; however, it does not work well with knowledge. As a public good, knowledge
does not diminish and cease to be available to others after it is consumed by one
consumer. Reliance on market/price mode creates a trade-off between production and
allocation of knowledge. On one hand, establishing strong intellectual property rights can
optimize the production of knowledge by creating incentive of knowledge generation.
However, the cost of maintaining such rights is high and blocks wide access to the
knowledge, which ironically limits the successful allocation of knowledge resources
(Adler 2001).
In the hierarchy form of organization, authority is the primary coordinating
mechanism. Under hierarchy, knowledge is often treated as a scarce resource and
therefore located along with decision rights in either specialized functional units or at
higher organizational levels. Such an institutional structure may work efficiently when
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dealing with routine tasks, but is inefficient for non-routine innovative tasks. Even if
authority mandates the free availability of knowledge and solves the knowledge
allocation problem, it cannot create the incentive to create knowledge (Adler 2001) .
Community/trust is a more efficient mechanism when facilitating knowledgeintensive activities, because trust can both reduce transaction costs by replacing contracts
with handshakes and reduce agency risks by replacing fear of shirking and
misrepresentation with mutual confidence (Adler 2001). Therefore, trust mitigates the
coordination difficulty created by the characteristics of knowledge as a public good. As
knowledge management becomes increasingly important in today’s organizations, trust
becomes increasingly attractive as a coordination mechanism.
2.5

Self-Control
In addition to three sources of control initiated from the organization, employee

self-control can be seen as a fourth form of control. In this section, I review literatures
about

self-management

and

self-leadership.

The

former

concept

is

often

used

interchangeably with “self-control”, while the later concept includes “self-control” but
also goes beyond it.
2.5.1

Self-Management
Self-management in organizational contexts refers to the phenomenon that a

person behaves in a way congruent with organizational goals without being subject to
external controls. In self-management, individual employees set up standards and then
monitor, evaluate and reward their own behaviors. The evaluation standards in selfmanagement can come from past performance, the observed performance of others, and
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socially acquired performance criteria (Mahoney 1974). In a work environment,
supervisors often cannot control all the factors influencing employees’ behaviors. If
employees can specify contingencies to influence their own behaviors, these selfinfluenced behaviors can be a substitute for formal leadership (Manz and Sims Jr 1980).
The consequences resulting from self-management have two levels: those directly
involved in the self-controlling process, and those resulting from the outcome of selfcontrolling behaviors. All people exercise self-control sometimes. Self-management
occurs in many situations, even when external controls are strong (Mills 1983). Thoresen
and Mahoney (1974) conclude that most successful self-control methods typically
involve some interaction with external control.
The benefits of self-management to employees are to avoid “over attribution”
(Manz and Sims Jr 1980). Over attribution is the tendency that people explain others’
behaviors by internal personal dispositions, while explaining their own behavior in terms
of external situations (Jones 1976). When employees take responsibility for their own
behaviors, observer bias can be limited. Self-management is a cost-effective management
method for organizations. However, organizations need to direct self-management
behaviors to avoid dysfunctional self-management.
There

are

two

major

self-management

strategies:

environmental

planning,

referring to changing factors in the environment so that positive behaviors are more likely
to occur, and behavioral programming, referring to rewarding or correcting oneself based
on performance (Manz and Sims Jr 1980). Five procedures to implement these two
strategies are: 1) self-observation: systematic data gathering about one’s own behavior in
order to establish the basis for self-evaluation; 2) specifying goals, especially publicly; 3)
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cueing strategies - limiting environmental factors that lead to undesirable behavior while
increasing those evoking desirable behavior, 4) incentive modification - self-reward and
self-punishment, and 5) rehearsal - systematic practice of a desired performance (Manz
and Sims Jr 1980).
Organization managers/leaders can help their subordinates to engage in selfmanagement behavior. Leaders should be role models in this process, and their strategies
change as .the subordinates become more capable of self-management during the process.
At the beginning, leaders reinforce behaviors that lead to good performance, and then
they gradually shift to reinforce the strategies or processes of self-management such as
goal setting and self-reinforcement (Manz and Sims Jr 1980).
Several factors can affect the appropriateness of using self-management,
including nature of the task, nature of the problem, the availability of time, and the
importance of subordinate development (Manz and Sims Jr 1980). It is more suitable to
use self-management when the nature of the task is creative, analytical, or intellectual in
nature. Self-management is appropriate when organizations are solving unstructured
problems; the information needed to solve the problems comes from subordinates; the
solutions to the problems must be accepted by subordinates to ensure implementation;
and subordinates internalize organizational goals (Manz and Sims Jr 1980). The
availability of time is an important factor that determines the importance of subordinate
self-management. In short-term efficiency mode, self-management is de-emphasized,
while in development mode, self-management is emphasized as an investment in the
future.
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Self-management is appropriate for situations in which organizations cannot
adequately measure the behavioral performance or standardize the work process

(Mills

1983). In these situations the behavioral and outcome controls are not feasible. For
example,

when

the

tasks

conducted

by

employees

involve

interactions

with

customer/client, employees are likely to confront unexpected, unfamiliar, and novel
events because the reciprocal transactions between the client and the employee generate
an environment with high uncertainty (Mills 1983).
2.5.2

Self-leadership
Manz (1980) argues that self-influence is the ultimate system of control in

organizations and proposes a broader view of self-leadership. First, he argues that the
self-control system can be regarded as the focal point in organizational control systems.
All organizations exercise external control, either by implementing formal controls such
as behavior or outcome control, or by influencing employees with informal clan control.
Meanwhile, each employee possesses his/her own self-control system, which functions
similar to organizational formal control systems, and has his/her own natural motivations,
beliefs, and values, which are similar to components in clan control. Organizational
control systems influence people but they do not directly determine people’s actions.
Ultimately, “the impact of organizational control mechanisms is determined by the way
they influence, in intended as well as unintended ways,

the self-control systems within

organization members” (Manz, 1986, p 586). In this sense, self-control is tightly
integrated into organizational control systems and can be regarded as the focal point of
organizational control.
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Second, Manz (1986) proposes an expanded self-leadership view. This view not
only includes self-imposed strategies for managing tasks lacking intrinsic motivation but
also includes self-influence processes that capitalize on the intrinsic motivational value of
task activities. He further clarifies three interrelated concepts about self-control. The
concept of self-regulation refers to the cybernetic control process conducted by
employees to manage their own behaviors. The concept of self-management focuses on
the strategies to facilitate one’s own behaviors to meet standards. Self-leadership
represents a broader view, which includes self-management strategies, but also goes
beyond a behavioral focus to address how appropriate or how desirable the standards are
themselves.
Self-leadership recognizes the importance of intrinsic motivations, the rewards
that result from performing the activities themselves Manz (1986). Three important
motivation factors include feelings of competence, self-control and purpose. Several
strategies can be used to address these three intrinsic motivational aspects: 1) allowing
employees to choose their own work contexts or environments, 2) building natural
rewards into the process of performing a task, and 3) encouraging employees to
psychologically focus on the pleasant aspects of the work.
2.6

Portfolios of Controls
Storey (1985) suggests that control usually works in levels and cycles, so that if

one level of control fails in an organization, then other forms will assume dominance.
The same ideas have been developed by more recent studies on organizational controls,
which suggest that a portfolio of controls that combines different forms of control works
more effectively than just a single form of control.
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Adler (2001) agrees with Ouchi (1979; 1980) that there exist three combinations
of organization forms and controls, which are market/price, hierarchy/authority, and
community/trust. However, he disagrees with Ouchi that each organization only favors
one type of control. He argues that different institutions combine the three
forms/mechanisms in different proportions. More importantly, he proposes that as the
economy becomes increasingly knowledge intensive, there is a trend toward greater
reliance on trust rather than the other two types of controls.
Cardinal, Sitkin et al. (2004) examine the creation and evolution of organizational
control during organizational founding process. They show how organizational controls
are created and evolve through specific phases of the founding period, and provide data
and insights about what drives shifts in the use of various types of controls. Among other
contributions, they define the balance of controls as a harmonious use of multiple forms
of control, and find that an imbalance among formal and informal controls is the key
driver of shifts in control configurations. This study shows that informal and formal
controls need to co-exist to create effective control portfolios that lead to good
organization performance.
In addition, studies that investigate control issues in IT development projects have
explored the idea of the portfolio of controls in depth. These studies will be reviewed in
the section 3.9.2.
After reviewing the dominant views on controls and the recent development on
control theory, the following two sections turn to two other perspectives on controls:
disciplinary power and the dialectic of control.
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2.7

Disciplinary Power and Control
Foucault (1979) uses the term “disciplinary power” to refer to the notion that

individuals and groups often discipline themselves unconsciously even without visible
external control present at the moment. Under disciplinary power, conformance to control
is not obtained by physically and personally exercising power over the ones being
controlled. Instead, social actors interpret that they should be subject to control and
choose to behave properly even if alternative courses of action might relieve their
oppression (Robey and Boudreau 1999).
One of the key characteristics of power and control under disciplinary power is
their invisibility. In this situation, controls are exercised indirectly and impersonally. The
controls might be excised through institutional, technical, or normative regulations, and
an example can be people who are forced to follow the work procedures embedded
within an information technology tool that they have to use (Orlikowski 1991). Foucault
(1979) explains that, traditionally, power and controls were often very visible, and those
who were controlled were less visible. The ones who were controlled “received light only
from that portion of power that was conceded to them or from the reflection of it that for
a moment they carried” (Foucault, 1979, p187). In this sentence, Foucault used a
metaphor to describe the visibility/invisibility of the power. The power is like the light
from a lighthouse, and those being controlled are in the dark most of the time and they
are only visible at the moments that the power is exercised on them. However,
disciplinary power is the opposite. It “is exercised through its invisibility; at the same
time it imposed on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility.”
Disciplinary power makes those who are controlled very visible, assuring that power can
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be exercised on them. “It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be
seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection” (Foucault, 1979, p187).
2.8

Dialectic of Control
Based on the central notion from structuration theory that a human agent has the

capability to choose to act in alternative ways, Giddens (1979; 1984) uses the term
“dialectic of control” to describe the intrinsic relationship between agency and power.
Giddens argues that power relations are always two-way.
“However subordinate an actor may be in a social relationship, the very fact of
involvement in that relationship gives him or her certain amount of power over
the other. Those in subordinate positions in social systems are frequently adept at
converting whatever resources they possess into some degree of control over the
conditions of reproduction of those social systems.” (Giddens 1979, p 6)
Giddens explains the notion of dialectic of control in the context of critiquing Max
Weber’s conception of bureaucracy, although he believes that the notion has a broader
scope. Giddens primarily focuses on two elements of Weber’s conception: the hierarchy
of offices, and the significance of bureaucratic rules.
First, Weber suggests that both authority and power in bureaucracies become
‘drained off’ towards the top. Bureaucracy causes a progressive decline in autonomy in
the lower levels of the hierarchy. Giddens critiques that in modern bureaucratic systems,
there is much space for those assuming subordinate roles to acquire or regain control over
their organizational tasks than Weber recognizes. “The more tightly-knit and inflexible
the formal relations of authority within an organization, in fact, the more the possible
openings for circumventing them” (Giddens 1979, p145). Giddens also argues that the
formal authority relations within bureaucracies are not consensually accepted through all
levels of the organization. Instead, these dominant symbol-systems are usually accepted
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predominantly by those in the higher authority position. Those in the subordinate
positions still have autonomy and can maintain the element of control by resisting or
distancing themselves from oppressive tasks, which represents an extension of control.
Second, Giddens argues that although the written rules exist within bureaucratic
organizations as an important component, the rules do not follow or interpret themselves,
and often do not provide much more of a focus for conflict than Weber acknowledges.
Written rules, however strictly designed, often leave spaces for human agents to choose
to do otherwise. When agents act following written rules, their actions are enabled and
restrained by rules, and at the same time, their actions produce and reproduce those rules.
Therefore, Giddens stressed,
“The dialectic of control operates even in highly repressive forms of
collectivity or organization. For it is my argument that the dialect of control is
built in to the very nature of agency, or more correctly put, the relation of
autonomy and dependence, which agents reproduce in the context of the
enactment of definite practices. An agent who does not participate in the dialectic
of control, in a minimal fashion, ceases to be an agent.” (Giddens 1979, p149)
2.9

Research on Controls in Information Systems Research
Information system researchers conduct research on the control issues in the

context of information systems. Much empirical research has been conducted in the
context of information systems development (ISD) projects to extend and elaborate
control theories. This branch of research contributes to the control theories from various
perspectives, including the antecedents of control modes, the portfolios of controls, and
the consequences of controls. In addition, information system researchers have explored
the impact of information technologies on organizational controls and the development,
use and impact of computerized monitoring systems.
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2.9.1

IS Studies on the Antecedents of Control Modes
Kirsch (1996) identifies the antecedent conditions that predict the type of controls

used in the context of information system development projects. Based on prior
theoretical and empirical work on control theory, Kirsch (1996) summarizes four types of
controls (behavior, outcome, clan, and self control), and integrates different theoretical
perspectives to predict the circumstances under which each type of control will be
implemented. While acknowledging that the characteristics of the task and the
organizational environment predict the use of various types of control as indicated in
prior studies, Kirsch (1996) also argues that control theory is incomplete when applied to
a

complex,

non-routine task such as the management of information systems

development. In particular, she proposes that the controller’s knowledge of the
transformation process of the task is also a key determinant of the type of control chosen.
Using data collected from survey responses from 96 participants in 32 system
development efforts, Kirsch concludes that (1) behavior observablility, controllers’ (in
this case, the project sponsor) knowledge about ISD process, and the interaction factor of
the two determine the amount of behavior control; (2) the use of outcome control is
determined by behavior observability and outcome measurability; and (3) the use of selfcontrol depends on outcome measurability and controllers’ knowledge about ISD. No
relationship between clan controls and the independent variables was found in this study.
Most of the previous studies investigate the choice of different control modes on
direct reporting relationships between ISD project leaders and their superiors in a
hierarchical setting. By contrast, Kirsch, Sambamurthy et al. (2002) examine the choice
of control modes in the client-IS relationships, which involve both hierarchical and lateral
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settings. Based on data gathered from a survey of 69 pairs of clients and IS project
leaders, this study re-affirms the antecedent conditions for the use of outcome and
behavior controls and provides additional empirical evidence for the use of self and clan
controls. The results suggest that the clients encourage IS project leaders to exercise self
control when task observability is low and outcome measurability is high, and that clients
implement clan control when behavior observability is high and clients have little
knowledge of the ISD process. Consistent with Kirsch (1996), understanding of the ISD
process is a key factor in controllers’ (in this case, the clients) choice of control modes.
2.9.2

IS Studies on the Portfolios of Controls
The idea of portfolios of controls have been investigated by IS researchers in the

context of IT project management. Henderson and Lee (1992) examine the relationship
between controls and team performance in IS design teams. They argue that controls in
IS design teams can be initiated by either team managers or project team members.
Managers influence the performance of the team by either behavior control or outcome
control, while team members also exercise control in the form of self-control or outcome
control. In addition, the authors argue for the combined effects of both managerial control
and team-control based on the work of Tannebaum (1968), which proposes that both
managerial controls and team-member control can operate concurrently and that their
effects are additive. The high degree of managerial control can ensure efficient
administration and the high degree of team-member control can foster identification,
motivation, and loyalty. Based on empirical data collected from 41 IS design teams,
Henderson and Lee (1992) conclude that the combination of managerial control and
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team-member control contributes to high team performance, especially when behavior
control from management and outcome control from team members are combined.
Kirsch (1997) examines how and why control portfolios vary in the context of IT
development projects. Conducting case studies of four IT development projects, she
explores how IS and user stakeholders exercise control to manage ISD projects and why
they choose to structure portfolios of control modes as they do. The findings show that
both users and IS play a critical role in controlling systems development projects, and
that all stakeholders implement a portfolio of control modes that typically includes both
formal (outcome and behavior) and informal (clan and self) controls. For each control
mode, a variety of mixed and overlapping control mechanisms are implemented. When
stakeholders construct the control portfolios, they typically start with pre-existing
mechanisms of formal controls, and then design new control mechanisms to implement
formal control or add informal controls to supplement formal controls. Consistent with
prior studies on antecedents of selecting control modes in ISD projects (Kirsch 1996),
this study confirms that the choice of particular control mechanisms depends on task
characteristics, role expectations (meaning that organization members in certain roles are
expected to behave in certain patterns), and project-related knowledge and skills.
Following the work of Kirsch (1997), Choudhury and Sahberwal (2003) explore
the control portfolios in outsourced ISD projects. Similar to Kirsch (1997), they examine
mechanisms in the portfolios of controls, the change of the portfolios of controls during
projects, and factors influencing the change of the portfolios. The difference is that they
focus on the outsourced rather than in-house projects. They found that the portfolios of
control in outsourced ISD projects have similarities with and differences from those in
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traditional ISD projects. Both types of projects are managed by a portfolio of controls.
However, outcome controls dominate outsourced projects, especially in the initial stage
of the projects. Behavior controls and mechanisms that encourage and enable vendors’
self-control are often added in the later stage of projects. Clan controls are less used -only in situations when the client and vendor have shared goals and when frequent
interactions lead to shared values. In general, the outsourced projects tend to start with
simple controls but add additional controls after experiencing performance problems. The
factors influencing choice of a set of controls are similar to those in the traditional ISD
projects. The three most important influencing factors at the start of the project are the
client's perception of the vendor’s knowledge of the project, the consequent role
expectations, and perceptions of difficulty in monitoring vendor behavior. These factors
outweigh the potential influence of the controller's project-related knowledge and project
size. The vendor’s performance in the early stage of project significantly influences the
construction of control portfolios in the later stage of the project.
Kirsch (2004) takes a process view of control portfolios in ISD projects. She
examines how stakeholders exercise controls during different phases of large IS projects
and why control choices change across project phases. The findings show that during the
initial phase of a project, control is exercised as "collective sense-making," in which both
IS and business stakeholders utilize mostly informal mechanisms of control. During the
development phase, IS managers structure hierarchical relationships with subordinates
and rely extensively on formal control mechanisms. Kirsch labels this phase as “technical
winnowing". During the implementation phase, both IS and business stakeholders
employ

formal

and

informal

mechanisms

to

exercise

control

as

"collaborative
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coordinating". This study also finds that the factors triggering the changes in control
choices from one phase to another lie in the project, stakeholder, and global contexts. As
factors change across phases, so too do control choices.
2.9.3

IS Studies on the Consequences of Controls
Nidumolu and Subramani (2003) examine the relationships between the modes of

control used in ISD projects and the projects’ performance. They differentiate controls
along two dimensions: the process approach and the structure approach. They refer to
behavior controls (specifying methods) and outcome controls (specifying performance
criteria) as the process approach, and refer to control through standardization (centrally
devised standards for activities) and decentralization (delegation of authority for decision
making) as the structure approach. This study synthesizes these two approaches and
suggests four control modes: standardization of methods, standardization of performance
criteria, decentralization of methods, and decentralization of performance criteria. By
associating these four control modes with projects’ performance in a sample of 56 firms
in the software industry, the authors find that two control modes, standardization of
performance criteria and decentralization of methods lead to better project performance,
that is, performance criteria should be uniform across projects while project teams should
have the autonomy to choose their own methods. The other two control modes,
standardization of methods and decentralization of performance criteria are not related to
project performance.
Piccoli and Ives (2003) examine the relationship between behavior control and
trust in the context of virtual teams. Behavior control has been found effective in
stimulating

team

performance,

fostering

cooperation,

and

improving

individual
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psychosocial outcomes in traditional co-located teams (Henderson and Lee 1992; Pinto,
Pinto and Prescott 1993). However, its effect in virtual teams was unknown before this
study. Piccoli and Ives (2003) propose and confirm through their empirical study that the
behavior control mechanisms have a significant negative effect on trust in temporary
virtual teams, where trust can emerge quickly and deteriorate rapidly. Through in-depth
analysis, they find that decline of trust in virtual teams is rooted in instances of reneging
and incongruence. Reneging means that a team member knowingly fails to fill her
obligations, and incongruence means that a team member’s perception of her own
obligation differs from her team mate’s. Mechanisms of behavior control, such as
definition of explicit work assignment, specification of rules and procedures, and the
filing of project plans and project reports, makes reneging and incongruence more easily
detected by the team and thus appears more salient, leading to trust decline in virtual
teams.
2.9.4

IS Studies on Computerized Monitoring Systems
Computer-based monitoring is the practice of collecting performance information

on employees through the computers they use at work (George 1996). Much research
conducted from the 1980s to 1990s in the field of IS addresses the issue of design, use,
and impact of computerized monitoring systems.
Drawing on the cybernetic view of control, Grant and Higgins (1996) propose a
multi-dimensional view of computer monitoring systems, which describes monitor
designs in terms of object of measurements, tasks measured, recipients of data, reporting
period, and message content. The contribution of this multi-dimensional view is that a
monitoring system is no longer seen as a uniform black box. Computer monitoring
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systems vary along several dimensions, which can be used as independent variables in
later studies to investigate the impact of monitoring systems in depth.
Grant and Higgins (1991) also examine the impact of computerized performance
monitoring and control systems (CPMCS) on employees’ attitudes towards work.
Especially, they investigate how the design and use of CPMCSs affect the employees’
attitudes toward the relative importance of productivity and the relative importance of
customer services. Based on the survey data collected on non-supervisory service
workers that performed computer-mediated work and had direct contact with customers,
the findings show that the use of CPMCS does not automatically decrease employees'
perceived importance of service quality or increase employees' perceived importance of
productivity. Instead, many other factors affect employees’ attitudes toward various job
dimensions. Acceptance of CPMCS by employees is very essential. When a monitoring
system is well-designed and appears to be credible, it can increase employees’ attitude
toward importance of production. Otherwise, a monitoring system lacking credibility and
acceptance can lead to employees' resistance and other negative reactions to monitoring.
George (1996) conducted case studies in five organizations that used computer
monitoring in practice. He focuses on the following

aspects that have inconsistent

findings in prior studies: employee attitudes toward computer-based monitoring, potential
trade-off between quality of work and quantity of work, relationship between computerbased monitoring, stress and illness, and employee's perceptions of supervision. He finds
that the practices of computerized monitoring are not uniform across organizations. How
monitoring is practiced and how monitoring data are used in employees’ evaluation differ
significantly between organizations. Many factors lead to this variation, such as the type
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of job, the data used for evaluation, management attitudes, and organizational culture.
These variations in turn affect the impact of computer-based monitoring on employees
and organizations.
2.9.5

IS Studies on the Impact of IT on Organizational Controls
Orlikowski (1991) examines the impact of

information technologies deployed in

work processes on the forms of control and forms of organizing. She finds that
information technology augments and extends existing mechanisms of control as well as
reinforces established forms of organizing. Specifically, when information technology
mediates work processes, it creates an information environment that facilitates
decentralization and flexible operations, and meanwhile generates a matrix of control by
increasing the dependence on centralized knowledge and power.
Coombs, Knights et al. (1992) argue that although information technologies are
rarely

introduced

intensification of

into

organizations

for

control purposes, they often result in

control by encouraging self-controls among organization members.

This agrees with Foucault’s “disciplinary power” (Foucault 1979). Coombs, Knights et
al. (1992) apply this theoretical idea to interpret a case study on the introduction of
information systems to the U.K. National Health Service. The new information system
required physicians to conduct extensive cost reporting. By using the information system,
physicians shifted their attention toward the issue of resource cost, and subsequently
redefined their criteria to select treatments and procedures. Consequently, physicians
became dependent on the computer-mediated practices that involved them in the
management such as cost control in addition to proving health services.
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Information availability and accuracy play an essential role in shaping the
organization control system, no matter which control modes are adopted. The use of
information systems not only automates work processes but also generate information
about the underlying work processes, and therefore previously opaque information such
as behaviors and outcomes become much more transparent between parties. Zuboff
(1988) characterizes this phenomenon as “informating”. According to agency theory and
the notion of informating, managers (principals) can successfully implement information
systems to increase information transparency and tighten controls in most situations.
However, when the employees (agents) are autonomous and managers lack the
legitimacy to mandate that their employees use the information systems, problems will
occur. Kohli and Kettinger (2004) conducted an action research study to learn how
hospital managers can successfully implement information system to monitor and
benchmark autonomous physicians’ medical practices. They call the process “informating
the clan” because physicians are mostly self-managed and subject to concertive control.
Eventually the system was implemented successfully after the hospital managers
promoted an influential physician to direct the information systems implementation
project, customized the interface of the system to improve ease of use, and facilitated
discussion of the value of using such system within physician communities.

Kohli and

Kettinger (2004) conclude that a clan can be informated if the principal can legitimized
the “human messenger” and “technical messenger”, and facilitate clan-based discussion.
In this case, the “human messengers” are the influential physicians, the “technical
messengers” are the friendly user interface, and the clan-based discussions are the
discussions within physicians’ community.
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2.10 Studies on Organizational Controls in the Context of Telework
There are a few studies investigating organizational controls in the context of
telework. Kurland and Egan (1999) conducted a survey to study the relationships among
telecommuting,

organizational

monitoring

strategies

(outcome-oriented

or

behavior-

oriented), and organizational justice perceptions (distributive, procedural, or interactional
justice). They conclude that monitoring strategies are more strongly associated with
organizational

justice

perceptions

than

with

telecommuting,

and

procedural

and

interactional justice perceptions are significantly related to telecommuting. Kurland and
Cooper (2002) studied how managers’ monitoring strategies (behavior, output, clan) link
to telecommuters’ professional isolation concerns. Their findings show that supervisors
in telework face the challenges to exercise clan strategies such as fostering synergy,
replicating informal learning, and creating interpersonal relationships. As a result,
telecommuters have fewer professional development opportunities and experience
professional isolation in their work. Dimitrova (2003) examines the relationship between
control and employees’ autonomy in telework. Through interviewing professional,
managerial and sales teleworkers, the study finds that the changes in control and
autonomy are limited to reconfiguration of the work schedule.
Although these three studies in the context of telework all investigated
organizational controls, their focus is to investigate the impact or the consequences of
organizational controls on employees, whether it is perceived organizational justice
(Kurland and Egan 1999), perceived professional isolation (Kurland and Cooper 2002) or
employee autonomy (Dimitrova 2003). The studies only touch on the topic of how
organizations exercise control in this relatively new work arrangement. Dimitrova (2003)

36

concludes that there are no significant changes between the management practices in
telework and non-telework. Furthermore, these three studies do not explicitly investigate
the role of information technologies in organizational controls in telework. Kurland and
Cooper (2002) and Dimitrova (2003) state that they did not find that information
technologies change the controls within telework. I believe that more detailed elaboration
of the organizational controls in telework is needed because it may explain the resistance
of telework programs from middle managers, and it is worthwhile to explore explicitly
the role of information technologies because they are the key enablers of telework.
Therefore, my research focuses on these two research gaps.
2.11 Summary of Literature Review
In summary, control theories are a key area with a long-term research stream in
organization studies. Any organization needs to implement control to align organization
members’ diverse interests with overall organization goals. To better understand controls
in organizations, researchers conceptualize control from different perspectives, such as
regarding control as cybernetic systems or theorizing control in terms of principal-agent
relationships. Researchers also differentiate among the types of controls. Within formal
control systems, controls are categorized as behavior control or output control according
to control targets. Market, bureaucracy, and clan are recognized as three sources of
controls, each with its own coordination mechanism. In addition, self-control is proposed
as an alternative to formal control systems. Traditionally, the research focus of controls
investigates contingency factors that predict which controls should be used. Recently,
researchers begin to study complex control systems. The research focus moves from
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identifying suitable controls according to antecedent factors to combining different
controls to establish a portfolio of controls.
Control issues have been studied in the field of information systems. In one
stream of research, researchers study controls in the context related to information system
design, development or implementation. A system development project is a complex
process involving multiple parties with diverse interests, thus providing a suitable
empirical context to test and advance control theories. At the same time, these studies
also contribute to theoretical understanding of information system related phenomena.
Another research stream contains studies of the impact of information technologies on
controls.

The

availability

of

information

technologies

changes

the

organization

environment, causing changes to organization controls. This research stream makes
theoretical contributions by extending or revising control theories so that they can explain
phenomena in new organizational forms enabled by information technologies. IS
researchers also apply control theories to study computer-based performance monitoring
systems.
Studies also focus on control issues in telework environments, and these studies
examine the impact of controls on teleworking employees. As telework gains popularity
in organizations, there is a need to study in-depth how organizations exercise controls in
this work environment.

3

Research Questions
Telework is becoming increasingly popular because of the trend of knowledge

economy, global-wise competition, and innovation in information technologies. Telework
programs can benefit both the employers and the employees when successfully
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implemented. Telework creates an organization environment that differs from the
traditional

office-based

organization

environment.

Employees

have

flexibility

to

configure their work time and work place. Managers can no longer easily manage by
walking around. Face-to-face interactions are decreased to a great degree. These new
characteristics of work environments create challenges for managers of telework. We
need formal knowledge about the management of telework to inform managers so that
the organizations can successfully implement telework programs.
Organizational control is one of the central problems of organization science.
Prior theories on organizational controls suggest that there are four different forms of
controls, formal controls such as behavior control and output control, and informal
controls such as clan control and self-control. Depending on contingency conditions such
as task and environment characteristics, different forms of controls operate in different
organizational contexts and multiple controls can be combined into control portfolios.
Because telework redefines the notion of the workplace and changes the organization
environment, traditional control theories may not directly apply. Then how does the
telework environment affect the use of different types of controls? Will organizations rely
more on outcome control because it is difficult to monitor employee in remote settings?
Will organizations rely on informal controls such as trust and employees self-discipline,
or will organizations rely on the electronic traces such as contents of emails to obtain the
information about the employees’ behaviors? How do these different forms of control
operate together in telework? In summary, our first research question is:
Research question 1: How do different forms of managerial controls operate in
telework?
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Moreover, information technologies are the key enablers of telework. In telework,
employees rely on information technologies to work and to communicate. Prior studies in
IS suggest that the use of information technologies can have an impact on controls.
However, it has not been explored how the use of information technologies in telework
relates to organizational controls. Are organizational controls embedded within the
information technologies that employees use everyday? Do managers control employees’
behaviors about how they use information technologies? In summary, our second
research question is :
Research Question 2: How does the use of information technologies relate to the
organizational controls in telework?

4
4.1

Research Approach
Research Assumptions and Research Paradigm
It is recommended for social science researchers to state explicitly two

philosophical assumptions - ontological and epistemological assumptions - because these
are the two key assumptions underlying the design of social science research (Orlikowski
and Baroudi 1991; Mason 2002). The ontological assumption is the researcher’ belief
about the nature of the phenomena, entities, or social “reality” under investigation; that is,
“whether the empirical world is assumed to be objective and hence independent of
humans, or subjective and hence having existence only through the action of humans in
creating and recreating it” (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). The epistemological
assumption is the researcher’s belief about the nature of knowledge and evidence of the
entities or social “reality” under investigation; that is, it is the researcher’s assumption
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whether and how social phenomena can be known, and how knowledge can be
demonstrated (Mason 2002).
My ontological assumption aligns with that of critical realism. The essence of
critical realism is the fusion of “…a stratified ‘naturalist’ ontology for the natural and
social sciences with a non-deterministic, non-Humean notion of causality” (Smith 2006,
p20). Critical realism differentiates two types of objects, intransitive objects and
transitive objects. Intransitive objects are the things and structures independent of our
perception of them. Transitive objects are “the artificial objects fashioned into items of
knowledge by the science of the day” (Bhaskar 1998: p.16). Our knowledge (transitive)
constitutes a part of the world (intransitive) that objectively exists. The distinction
between transitive and intransitive objects allows for the combination of an ontological
realism with an epistemological relativism (Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson and Norrie
1998), meaning that reality is intransitive, theories are fallible and changeable, and we
can exercise judgmental rationality to choose among competing theories (Danermark,
Ekstrom, Jokobsen and Karlsson 2003).
Critical realism accepts two forms of stratification. The first form of stratification
is between mechanisms, the events that they generate, and the subset of events that are
actually experienced (Mingers 2004). These three domains are also known as the real
(what exists), the actual (events), and the empirical (observable events). At the deepest
level, “the real” level, the whole of reality exists, including mechanisms, events, and
experiences. The “actual” contains the states and happenings resulting from the activation
of the causal powers at “the real” level. Furthermore, “the empirical” are the collection of
events in “the actual” that can be observed or experienced. This stratification shows us
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that we should not reduce all events to only the observed events, and we should not
reduce enduring causal mechanisms to events (Mingers 2004). The second stratification
is within the realm of objects themselves (Archer, Bhaskar et al. 1998). Causal
relationships at one level (e.g., chemical reactions) can be seen as generated by those of a
lower level (atomic valence). These dynamic, open, and stratified systems will interact
with each other, and particular structures give rise to certain causal powers or tendencies
(Mingers 2004), which are called by Bhaskar “generative mechanisms” (Bhaskar 1979, p.
170). The generative mechanisms interact with each other, and possibly counterbalance
each other, causing the presence or absence of actual events. Because of the two forms of
stratification, the structure and generative mechanisms of objects decouple from the
events that they produce, and the mechanisms in “the real” domain do not pre-determine
what will happen at any particular time but rather enable what can possibly happen. In
other words, mechanisms are better to be understood as tendencies rather than universal
laws (Smith 2006).
The phenomenon under investigation in my research is organizations’ controls in
telework. I acknowledge the three-level ontological stratification of this phenomenon. At
“the real” level, there exist physical objects, social objects and social structures, and their
generative mechanisms, which are independent of our perception of them. Physical
objects include information technologies that the employees adopt and use. Social objects
include users’ habits and behaviors. Social structures include rules and resources around
control issues in telework. We believe that generative mechanisms exist for control issues
in telework. That is, there exist certain causal powers, tendencies, and ways of acting that
can explain why and how a certain control will or will not work in telework environment.
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These generative mechanisms interact with other generative mechanisms in “the real” to
activate the events and happenings about organizations’ controls in telework at “the
actual” level. As researchers, we can observe the events at “the empirical” level, which is
only a subset of events at “the actual level”.
Epistemological assumptions are the researcher’s beliefs about how social
phenomena can be known, and how knowledge can be demonstrated (Mason 2002).
Epistemology “…concerns the criteria by which valid knowledge about a phenomenon
may be constructed and evaluated” (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). My epistemological
assumption aligns with that of interpretivism. “A fundamental distinction between the
interpretive and positivist world view is the former’s primary presumption of social
constructionism. Interpretive studies assume that people create and associate their own
subjective and inter-subjective meaning as they interact with the world around them”
(Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). Thus, despite the assumption of a real world independent
of human perceptions, our knowledge of that world is inevitably affected by social
interpretivism.
In my study of organizational controls in telework, although I believe that there
are “generative mechanisms” or tendencies independent of human beings, I also believe
that the process by which people come to understand and gain knowledge about these
“generative mechanisms” is a social construction process. At the same time, researchers’
investigation on this issue by gathering data at “the empirical” level is also a social
construction process. Therefore, people’s account of their perceptions and experiences of
the controls in telework are valid evidence of knowledge, and my theoretical
interpretation of the phenomena advance the knowledge of the problem area.
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Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) explain that interpretive researchers should avoid
imposing externally defined categories on a phenomenon; rather, they should attempt to
derive their constructs from the field by in-depth examination of the phenomenon of
interest. Walsham (1995a) argues that interpretive studies are suitable for the field of
information system because people’s perceptions regarding information systems use are
essential. . Furthermore, an interpretive paradigm is appropriate for studying social
processes because this

paradigm is explicitly designed to capture complex, dynamic,

social phenomena that are both context and time dependent (Orlikowski and Baroudi
1991). The research problem under investigation in my study is a complex and contextual
social process. Therefore, even as I acknowledge the objectivity of “generative
mechanisms” underlying the phenomenon, I believe that the phenomenon can be
observed and understood by studying my perceptions and interpretations of it, which are
subjective. Thus, interpretive inquiry allows me to capture and analyze the organizations’
controls and employees’ perceptions about the controls in telework.
The interpretive paradigm is not completely homogeneous. Orlikowski and
Baroudi (1991) differentiate between two variants of interpretive research: the “weak”
and the “strong” constructionist views. From the weak constructionist view, interpretive
research is thought to take a complementary position to positivist research. The strong
constructionist

view

claims

that

interpretive

research

should

replace

positivist

investigations. Similarly, Walsham (1995a) distinguishes among four different levels of
rhetoric qualifying interpretive work. In increasing order of their claims, those levels are:
the rhetoric of the exploratory study, the complementary approach rhetoric, the rhetoric
of appropriate research issues, and the replacement of positivism rhetoric. My research
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stands at the second and third rhetorical positions of Walsham’s framework - the
complementary approach rhetoric and the rhetoric of appropriate research issues. Under
the former rhetoric, interpretive and positivist research are seen as complementary and of
an equal status. Under the latter rhetoric, certain research issues fit the interpretive
approach, while others better fit the positivist approach. My own interpretive position is
“moderate.” I view the interpretive approach as more suited to research building theory,
and meanwhile I also value different approaches (such as those embodied in the positivist
paradigm) to proceed to thorough theory testing, and thus complete the full research cycle
(Galliers 1991). In other words, I believe that a qualitative research study is complete in
itself and should not be seen only as a pilot study or as preliminary to quantitative
research (Bottorff 1997). However, I am not against subjecting the results of qualitative
work, including those of the present research, to further empirical testing, evaluation, and
generalization. These assumptions are completely consistent with critical realism, which
asserts reality as objective and which values multiple research methods (Mingers 2004).
4.2
4.2.1

Research Methodology
Grounded Theory
The research method followed by this study is grounded theory (Glaser and

Strauss 1967; Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1989; Strauss and Corbin 1990). Applying grounded
theory research methodology, I studied two work groups with an objective of generating
a descriptive and explanatory theory about organizational controls in a telework
environment.
The grounded theory method (Strauss and Corbin 1990; Glaser 1992) is a
“qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an
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inductively derived theory about a phenomenon” (Strauss and Corbin 1990, p 24). The
resulting grounded theory specifies

the relationships among concepts and sets of

concepts with empirical evidences, and the theory

can be in the

form of a narrative

statement, visual picture, or in a series of hypotheses or propositions (Creswell 1998).
The benefit of the grounded theory approach is that the resulting theory is intimately tied
to the evidence (Eisenhardt 1989). Three intrinsic procedures in grounded theory are
inductive reasoning, interwoven data collection and data analysis, and theoretical
sampling.
Using grounded theory, researchers do not specify theory a priori and then
confirm the theory empirically. Instead, researchers apply inductive reasoning to discover
theory emerging from empirical qualitative data. The method allows researchers to
“develop a theoretical account of the general features of a topic while simultaneously
grounding the account in empirical observations or data” (Martin and Turner 1986, p
141). This inductive, theory discovery research mode can be particularly useful when no
prior theory has been established to date. Although control theories in general have
existed for a long time, they could not be directly applied in the new organizational
environment because telework differs from a traditional office-based work environment.
Therefore, I believe it is appropriate to employ grounded theory approach to elaborate
and extend control theories and to generate a theoretical account for the particular
phenomenon that I investigated.
Grounded theory requires that data collection be tightly interwoven with data
analysis. In the research process, both activities occur simultaneously, and data and
theory are constantly compared and contrasted during data collection and analysis. The
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emerging theoretical account generated from analysis of data collected in early stages
guides the data collection in later stages (Locke 1996). The interwoven nature of data
collection and analysis makes it possible for analysis to direct the process of theoretical
sampling, which refers to the technique of selecting incidents and informants on the basis
of concepts that are relevant to the emerging theoretical account. Theoretical sampling
applies both to the selection of the research site selection and the selection of the study
informants
The findings of

grounded theory studies are detailed and particularistic, but a

more general explanation can be produced from the results (Eisenhardt 1989; LeonardBarton 1990). The generalization here is different from the more typical statistical
generalization, which refers to generalizing from a sample to population. Rather, the
generalization is “analytic generalization” (Yin 1989), meaning that inductive concepts
generated by the field study are combined with insights from existing formal theory
(Glaser and Strauss 1967). So what is generalized is the theoretical concepts and patterns.
The outcome of my study is a general conceptualization of the organizational controls in
telework that should both contribute to our research knowledge and inform IS practice.
Since two schools of thought now exist in the grounded theory approach,
grounded theorists often need to take a stand on a specific version of the methodology
(Boudreau 1999). The two schools of thought in grounded theory are the Straussian (after
Anselm Strauss) and the Glaserian (after Barney Glaser), each presenting different
assumptions and methods (Stern 1994). Locke (1996) summarizes the key difference
between the two schools. The Straussian school encourages the researchers to take an
active, even provocative role when collecting and analyzing the data, whereas the
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Glaserian school suggests that researchers should prevent and minimize their impact on
the data and allow the data to speak for themselves. In my research, I applied the
grounded theory methodology aligned with the Straussian school of thought. First, I agree
that it is difficult to pursue research with a “clean slate”. Second, my research intends to
provide a theoretical account of organizational controls in telework to extend or refine the
existing theories on organizational controls, Last, my research is primarily based on the
methods and procedures presented in Strauss and Corbin (1990). Thus I followed the
Straussian school when conducting this study.
4.2.2

Research Site
In site selection, I followed the strategic sampling technique for qualitative

research, which means choosing a site or group that will provide some insights about the
main research questions. Because the phenomenon under investigation is organizations’
controls in telework, I accessed a site where employees primarily worked at home and
away from their managers. Time limitation compels me to investigate a single
organization as opposed to many. This is not problematic, given that data generated
through the investigation of a single site is likely to be comprehensive enough to conduct
a thorough exploration of the control issue in telework.
The research site is two groups within a large corporation, TechCo1 . TechCo
develops innovative information technologies products and services and has employees
around the globe. In order to attract and retain talent around the globe and save real estate
costs, TechCo promotes telework with their employees. Within corporate resources, there
is a division of people, Telework Support Program, working especially for the purpose of
1

All names are pseudonyms.
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supporting TechCo’s telework environment. Meanwhile, employees within Telework
Support Program also practice telework in their daily work. I accessed two work groups
within Telework Support Program, Work Location Service Group and Product
Development Group as our research site.
These two groups were ideal for the study because they not only practiced
telework but they also promoted it at TechCo. In contrast to groups involved in Software
Engineering (who seemed less receptive to being studied), the Telework Support Program
was receptive to my efforts to study telework. Therefore, selecting these two groups was
aligned with the principle of theoretical sampling.
4.2.3

Data Generation
In this research, I used qualitative interviews as my primary data collection

method. Choosing interviews as primary data sources best serves the research goal and
agrees with my research methodology strategy. The research question is to investigate
and understand the organizations’ controls in telework. People’s interpretations,
perceptions, meanings and understandings of their experiences with controls in telework
are the major data I sought to collect. Qualitative interviewing is an effective method to
get the inside views from study participants. Moreover, although in theory it would be
ideal to conduct observations to complement interview data sources, it was not feasible in
practice because the study participants worked primarily at home and were remote from
each other and from me.
The targeted interviewees included people who exercise control and people who
are controlled in telework. I conducted interviews from June 2007 to December 2007. I
first interviewed the primary contact and the director of the Telework Support Program to
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understand the general work practice of Telework Support Program, and then I
interviewed the directors and employees in two workgroups, Work Location Service
Group and Product Development Group, within Telework Support Program. The
interviews were conducted face-to-face if possible or via telephone when face-to-face
interviews could not be arranged. Each person within the two work groups was
interviewed twice, and each interview ranged from 45 minutes to two hours. Table 1
shows the number of interviews. I began each interview with open-ended questions
related to our research. For example, to investigate organizational controls in telework, I
asked the interviewees, “How does your organization, your managers, and you yourself
make sure that you work productively even when you work at home?” In order to
investigate how the use of information technologies related to organizational controls in
telework, I asked the interviewees, “Describe the adoption and use of a particular
information technology in your work and how is your manager involved in this process?”
After the starting questions, the interviews were in conversational style and the following
questions or probes depended on the answers given by a specific study participant.
Table 1: Study Participants and Interviews
Participants
Interviews
Telework Support Program Director
1
Primary contact in Telework Support Program
1
Work Location Service Group Director
2
Work Location Service group team members (4 8
people)
Product Development Group Director
2
Product Development Group Team members (7 14
people)
Other employees in TechCo (8 people).
8
Total
36

Strauss and Corbin (1990) state that in grounded theory inquiry theoretical
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sampling cannot be planned before embarking on the study and the specific sampling
decisions should evolve during the research process itself. Therefore, the data collection
phase is parallel with the data analysis phase. Analysis of data obtained in the early stage
is used to guide data collection in later stages. I followed this principle in my research. I
first interviewed people in Location Service Group, conducted preliminary analysis on
the data and used the results of the analysis to direct my interviews with people in
Product Development Group. I exited the field when I reached “theoretical saturation”,
meaning that I exited when I could not identify new themes from my interviews.
4.2.4

Data Analysis
The objective of data analysis is to subject the interview transcriptions to

interpretation using coding analysis techniques. I conducted data analysis using three
phases of coding suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1990): open, axial, and selective
coding. My overall research strategy is inductive, meaning that theory is developed
through data generation and data analysis (Mason 2002). I did not formulate hypotheses
based on the literature prior to my empirical research. I did review the prior literature on
controls to increase my sensitivities with regard to the research problem, and these
literatures provided me a starting point in my research. Increasing the researcher’
sensitivity on the research problem at hand by reading literatures is recommended by
Strauss and Corbin (1990).
This research strategy directs my data analysis phase. By iterating from data and
theory, I eventually generated theoretical explanations.
Step 1: Open coding
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The data analysis started with open coding. The incidents, events, quotes and
other instances gathered during data generation were compared to examine similarities
and differences. From the transcribed interviews and notes, similar data were grouped
together and labeled by categorical codes. In open coding, I first developed an initial list
of codes based on my literature review on control theories. The initial list of codes is
listed in appendix 1. Control mechanisms of outcome control, behavior control, clan
control and self-controls were identified and used as codes. I also coded

employees’

uses of information technologies. When applying these codes to the interview
transcription, there were some incidents and quotes that did not fit into these existing
codes, which required that I generated new codes for them.
Step 2: Axial coding
After open coding was finished, I made adjustments by combining redundant
codes. I conducted axial coding by organizing data according to the recurring theme and
linked the associated concepts to uncover the relationships among categories and
subcategories. The results of axial coding were a set of broad categories and associated
concepts that described and explained the organizational controls in telework. The codes
I used are listed in Appendix 2.
Step 3: Selective coding
After the general concepts and the relationships among these concepts were
generated, I conducted selective coding with an objective to uncover larger patterns by
integrating all analyses into one “core category”. The results of this analysis stage were a
story line describing a coherent conceptualization of the main phenomenon. Selective
coding was terminated when I reached theoretical saturation, which is indicated by the
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fact that no new or relevant data inform a category, the category development is densely
populated, and the relationships between categories are supported by adequate evidences.
Multiple Exemplars Data Presentation
In my analysis and results presentation, I used the “multiple exemplars” method
(Denzin 1989; Bechky 2006). Multiple exemplars is a qualitative study method that
allows the researchers to deconstruct prior conceptions of a particular phenomenon,
collect multiple instances that illustrate the concepts under study, and inspect these
instances carefully for essential elements or components. The elements are then
reassembled into a story line in a logical order.

to . In my study, first I provided the

description of the social contexts of the both group. Then, rather than analyzing control
within each participant group, I collected control instances from both of the participating
groups, used these instances as exemplars of control mechanisms, and described them
according to control forms.

5
5.1

Results
Social Contexts of the Two Groups
Work Location Service Group. Work Location Service Group (WLSG) group is a

work team within TechCo’s Telework Support Program. This team works on global work
location strategy, meaning that they identify, document, and facilitate the global
deployment for TechCo. Since TechCo is a global company and has workers in many
countries and areas, this group supports decision making regarding the locations in which
TechCo is going to invest or disinvest on a global basis. The typical issues that they
address are where TechCo will have workforce, what skill sets will be required for the

53

workforce, and what infrastructures (including physical, technology, and work practice)
will be needed for the new workforce. To achieve this purpose, they conduct research on
the demographics of different locations around the world, and constantly monitor trends
within the company. Their work activities include online research, gathering data by
interviewing internal or external stakeholders, analyzing data, and writing reports.
WLSG is a small group, and the team members are distributed. They have one
group director and four group members. The group leader, Kevin, and one of the group
members, Mary, live in the Bay area, California and are close to TechCo’s headquarters.
The other three group members -- Kate, Mathew, and Roan -- live in Colorado near
another TechCo campus. Four of the five people (all except Mary) are home-based and
thus primarily work at home. Mary is flex-based. She comes to office regularly but has
no permanently assigned office. Team member Roan and Kate joined the group one year
ago and are relatively new to the group. All members have worked for TechCo for a long
period except Mary who has worked for TechCo for only two years.
Since their group is distributed, they rely on technologies for everyday
communications. Email and phone are the primary tools. Instant messenger is used
among Mary, Mathew, and Kevin. They occasionally use an online collaborative tool
called WebEx. They physically meet at least twice a year either in the Bay area or in
Colorado. Otherwise they hold weekly teams meetings and one-on-one meetings with
their manager electronically.
Product Development Group. The product development group (PDG) is a group
within TechCo’s Telework Support Program. This group is responsible for designing and
developing “products” to support the distributed work environment in TechCo. The
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products include real estate design, information technologies, and human resource work
practices. The typical work assignments for this group include designing information
systems such as office reservation systems, online data collaboration tools, architectures
for new office buildings, and new performance mapping and reward systems to fit the
telework environment.
There are currently eight people in the group, reduced from 12 by a recent
reduction of workforce. Their group includes people from three different backgrounds:
real estate (2 people), information technology (5 people), and human resources (1
person). They are a distributed team, all based primarily at home. The manager, Mack, is
located on the East coast. One group member lives in Arizona, and another one in New
Jersey. The other members of the group are located in the Bay area and live within
driving distance of TechCo headquarters. They hold face-to-face meetings at least twice a
year, and they hold virtual group meetings every two weeks. Since most of the
technology subgroup lives within driving distance of their office building, the have a
separate group meeting and social activities on campus every week. Because of the nature
of their work, PDG constantly experiments with different information technologies to
support telework. Besides using phone and email to communicate, they are mandated by
their manager to use an online calendar, video camera, and instant messenger.
After the reduction of the workforce, the nature of work and direction of the
group changed. The new plan emphasizes more on the human resource aspect of mobile
virtual work, and the technology sub-group is moving away from developing
technologies to support Telework and toward researching new technologies that have
potential to support virtual work.
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5.2

Organizational Controls within the Two Work Teams
I found that these two teams are managed by a combination of four forms of

controls: outcome, behavioral, clan and self-controls.
5.2.1

Outcome Controls

5.2.1.1 Goal Setting Process
TechCo had organizational-level policies on goal setting and goal cascading
processes. At the beginning of each fiscal year, first the vice-president-level managers set
the goals, followed by goals set at the director-level managers and then the employees.
The employees became owners or partial owners of the goals. The company encouraged
the managers to manage employees according to the goals rather than exercising personal
and direct supervision.
Both of the groups followed this goal setting process in their work. The managers
acknowledged that the goal setting was of great importance in their work and believed
that clear goal setting could reduce the need for constantly monitoring their employees.
Kevin, WLSG team director, focused on setting goals and setting associated timeframes
to reach these goals, and he expressed that he cared less about his employee’s working
behaviors on a daily basis as long as the goals were met on time.
“I don’t mind if they spend 8 o’clock in the morning to 6 o’clock in the night
working, or 8 o’clock to 6 o’clock in the zoo, as long as they meet their goals and
don’t’ miss the deadline.” Kevin, WLSG team director
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The goals were very detailed. The goals could be about an ongoing projects or
routine work. For example, a WLSG team member, had these goals for the following
year:
“(the goals) will be continuing on with the GIS project to implement the GIS, get
training on the GIS as well as ensure training for others in our group and
additionally I will have goals around the financial work I am doing on the
budget….” Roan, WLSG team member
The managers strived to set specific and clear goals with their employees, and
there were quantifiable metrics around the goals so that they could be easily measured
when it came to the performance evaluation time.
“TechCo likes to have sort of quantitative metrics around your goals, so you
know. You write one report a quarter…, there is a number associated with it.”
Roan, WLSG team member.
During the working process, goals were adjusted based on the current trend in the
company. Goals set at the beginning of the fiscal year were used as a guideline for their
work, but goals were evaluated periodically and priorities could change over time.
“On a quarterly basis, we will formally assess how we did. Do we meet our
objectives, do we fall behind? If for some reasons, this thing falls off the agenda,
if something else comes up -- we don’t need 4000 engineers on Minneapolis,
what we want is, 5000 sales people in Oshkosh -- OK. If that’s what is been told
by the company, let’s go down that path instead.” Kevin, WLSG team director
At the end of the fiscal year, when it came to the evaluation of the employees’
performance, the goals set at the beginning of the year played an important role.
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According to Matthew, WLSG team member, there was a detailed performance review
about what goals were achieved and what goals were not achieved. When the goals were
not met, there was an analysis whether it was intentional or unintentional, whether the
goal fell off the priority list and became irrelevant, or it was still relevant but was not
achieved. There were also discussions about goals that were supposed to be on the list but
were missing, and things that had been done but were not on the list.

5.2.1.2 Focus on Deliverables
In both groups, managers emphasized deliverables. For each work assignment, the
managers specified the deliverables and time frame to complete them. The employees
were measured on the quality and the timeliness of the deliverables. Mack, PDG team
leader, stated that the deliverables in his group were very specific.
“They can be very simplistic, such as the physical design standards or the
functional requirements for technologies to support [remote] work. They are
written documents.” Mack, PDG team leader
The managers believed that specifying and evaluating employees’ deliverables
could greatly, if not totally, replace monitoring employees’ behaviors on a day-to-day
basis, and thus they emphasized that they evaluate employees based on the “product”
rather than “process”.
“I am not going to judge you for being in the office for extended periods. I am
going to presume I give you work you can get it done...I am going to measure you
on your work product.” Kevin, WLSG team leader
Between getting clear instructions for deliverables and turning in deliverables for
evaluations, the employees worked rather independently. The management style was
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hands-off rather than micro managing. Mack, PDG team leader, expressed that working
independently was absolutely critical in his group.
“I am not going to tell you exactly how to build it, or how to create it, I want you
to tell me.… That is why we pay you to be expert…In some sense there is this
dichotomy that I am going to give you very very quantifiable deliverables, but I
want you to work independently to get to them.” Mack, PDG team leader
On the employee side, they felt that being evaluated on the quality and timeliness
of the deliverables made the work environment more “fair”.
“I think it is much more egalitarian when you are at home. You are judged more
on the merits of the output.” Matthew, WLSG team member

5.2.1.3 Checkpoints
While the employees worked on deliverables that were associated with the goals,
there were regular updates about the status of the work, which were referred as
“checkpoints”. Status update was a policy of the company that specified that the
employees should provide status updates every quarter. But in reality the status updates
happened more frequently than quarterly.
Much of the work these two groups did was research. Due to the uncertainties and
risks involved in research work, often ideal output could not be produced, and sometimes
the results of the research could not be immediately deployed. To address this concern,
checkpoints were scheduled according to the phase of the project. For example,
checkpoints might occur after the research results were delivered but before they were
deployed. This was to ensure that work was acknowledged even when it could not be
immediately deployed.
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“We will research and experiment, and we will do some sort of pilot if necessary.
Then we will take it up to these ladders, at the very end, a gateway, somebody will
say yes or no (to deploy it). …. For Mack’s eyes, he needs to see if that project
gets to that point, if it does get to that point (but cannot be deployed immediately),
we will just take a look of the research we have done. …We will put it in a folder
so people can get to it because people are just not ready for it right now.” Chad,
PDG team member
The checkpoints could be initiated by either the manager or by the employees.
Manager-initiated checkpoints often happened in the regular group meetings or in oneon-one meetings between the managers and the employees. In some cases, the managers
required the employees to publish periodic status reports.
“I have a teleconference with my entire team every week, where we go through
updates, pass downs… as well as 10 minute reviews with each person about, how
was your portfolio work? In addition to that, I have 1 hour calls with each person,
where I walk through their portfolio activity. And once a month we publish a full
status.” Kevin, WLSG team leader
Interestingly, checkpoints were also initiated by the employees. Employees often
reported to their managers what they were working on and their progress on the projects
even when the managers did not ask them to do so. This phenomenon is commonly seen
among the employees in these two groups. For example, Sage worked in Arizona, not
only away from his manager, but also away from his peers and any TechCo campuses.
He reported that he felt the need to proactively communicate to his managers about his
work status after he started working from home.

60

“Since I have been working from home…I’ve started to make sure I work
proactive in communicating, just to my own boss, what I am working on, what is
my status, what I am doing? Even if it is good, even it is I am on track. If it is due
in two weeks, one week has expired, I’ve done a week’s worth. I have one week
left. I will tell him that, so he knows.” Sage, PDG team member
In addition to reporting their positive progress on the projects, the employees also
took initiatives to ask for their managers’ inputs when the employees could not
independently solve a problem.
The major reason behind the employee-initiated checkpoints was the employees’
concern about visibility. Almost all the employees who worked at home reported that
they needed to take initiative to obtain visibility, and taking initiative to report their work
status was one of the important avenues to achieve this. Belinda, PDG team member,
periodically made appointments with her director or upper level management to talk
about her current work and the directions of her future work.
“You don’t want them to forget the work that you are doing and the value you
bring to the organization. So having kinda strategic check-ins, it fills a lot of
purposes. One, yes, I know about the strategic directions, I am fine with
continuing. But two, also reminds them just what it is what I am doing, where I
am, that type of thing.” Belinda, PDG team member
The second reason behind the employee-initiated checkpoints was that some
employees felt that in the telework environment, informal encounters were lacking. In an
office-based work setting, informal status updates could happen in casual talks in the
hallways or cafeterias. These opportunities for informal encounters were missing in
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telework, and so employees took initiatives to report their work status to make up for the
lost opportunities. Sage, PDG team member, primarily worked at home and was distant
from his boss and any major TechCo campus. He expressed concerns about lacking
informal conversations with his boss.
“You know, there is something missing…I felt like I could call my boss in Boston
any time. I wasn’t cut off. But if you never call you boss unless there is something
formal or important, and you didn’t have a few casual hallway bumps -- those are
the things that just stopped happening. You are kinda left with a gap or a hole”
Sage, PDG team member
The major distinction between employee-initiated checkpoints and other outcome
control mechanisms was that the other control mechanisms were imposed by the
manager, while the employee-initiated check points were initiated by the employees.

5.2.1.4 Issues with Outcome Control
The managers and the employees expressed concerns that, although they relied
heavily on outcome controls, sometimes it was difficult or even unjustifiable to apply
outcome controls. First, interactions between people and relationship building were
important in TechCo. These two groups conducted knowledge work. In addition to
producing results, these groups also had responsibility for sharing the knowledge
produced with the right people within the company through people interactions. These
people elements were difficult to capture within the outcome control.
“I think managing by results are probably 80%. That is gotta be 15% based on
subjective. The 15% human elements...Do not forget that… it may not be
measured in the results oriented piece.” Cadee, PDG team member
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Second, the research work done by these two groups involved uncertainties and
risks. Even if the employees worked hard, satisfactory outcome might not be easily
produced. In this sense, using outcome controls was not justified.
“Some of us are tech professionals that are 10 years or more out of schools. We
are solving problems that may not have been solved before… and there are maybe
a lot of creativity involved in the solution. What that means is that some percent of
the time you try, you will fail.” Diamond, PDG team member
Third, because research work was creative and original, the end results could not
be easily measured objectively. Thus, results were measured subjectively. This meant that
the outcome of the work had low measurability, which made exercising outcome controls
unsuitable.
“My own job, making meetings more productive.…. So obviously you are talking
about white collar productivity and no one knows how to measure that. Maybe
Mack did my review and says, ‘I think she did a good job.’ But I could work for
someone else... They weren’t that happy…I did exactly the same work, I got
different results.” Diamond, PDG team member
In summary, these two groups were managed by outcome controls. The outcome
control mechanisms included goal setting process, deliverable focus, and checkpoints.
Meanwhile, these two groups expressed that the nature of their work, research type of
work, made outcome control incomplete to some degree.
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5.2.2

Behavioral Control

5.2.2.1 Rules and Protocols
Both work groups set up rules and protocols for appropriate behaviors related to
availability, the use of technologies, and the workflow. Rules and protocols were critical
for maintaining the efficiency and quality of their work. There were some corporate-level
guidelines, but most of the rules and protocols were set up at the team level. Mack, PDG
team director, referred these protocols as roadmaps and blueprints for the team.
“We have all these roadmaps, blueprints, whatever you want to call it for doing
remote work. …we tried it very hard it make it part of our DNA.” Mack, PDG
team director
There were clear protocols explicitly set up by the managers, and there were soft
rules gradually formed during the work process. Soft rules will be further elaborated in
the clan control section. The content of the protocols included availability management,
the use of technologies, and workflow. Availability management and the use of
technologies will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.

Below is an

example of the protocols on workflow.
“We try to have some sort of protocols, who can and who cannot update
something. At the beginning of the project, we are going to define, OK. You are
someone who is going to update stuff. You are in charge of the specific part of the
project. So you are in charge of these sets of documents.” Chad, PDG team
member
When the rules and protocols were not followed, the managers exercised
sanctions. For example, in PDG group, there was a rule about using instant messenger
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(IM), an online tool with which people can exchange messages instantly. All people were
required to be logged into instant messenger during work time. One of the employees in
PDG did not follow the protocols about using IM, and he was laid off in workforce
reduction. Mack recalled one conversation he had with this person.
“I said, ’you just refused to use IM.’ ’Well, it isn’t something I am comfortable
with’, then I said, “Get comfortable because I don’t know what the hell you are
doing 50% of the time.’ That did not change. He was so set in his ways… He no
longer works for us.”Mack, PDG team director
This example shows that the manager explicitly specified the behavioral
standards, and when the employees violated the protocols, there was punishment
associated with it.

5.2.2.2 Availability Management
In telework, employees have flexibility to decide their own work time and space.
However, being available and accessible during work time and even in extended work
time became a behavior standard in both groups. To ensure availability, the managers
used three control mechanisms.
First, the managers made themselves highly available to their employees, working
as a role model for the employees. Through role modeling, the managers sent the
message to their employees that the appropriate behavior in telework was being available.
“He (the director) is there when you need to reach him and get a hold of him, ask
a question or need guidance. He doesn’t make you feel like if you call him out of
the blue, that he is still busy, that he cannot give you his time of the day. He is
very responsive.” Cadee, PDG team member
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Second, the managers set up specific rules and protocols about availability and
accessibility. TechCo used a technology that enabled its employees to forward their
office phone number to any phone that they were using. Kevin asked all his group
members to make themselves available through this phone number during work time.
Kevin explained his expectation for his team members on availability.
“You have a follow-me-phone. You have a number that goes with you wherever
you go. If you step out of the office, I expect this to be with you. During work
hours, I need to be able to get hold of you. If you were here in the office, I could
walk down the hall way to see you. So I need the ability to get you on the phone. If
you go off (the follow-me-phone) in an extended period, I need to know.” Kevin,
WLSG team director
The third way of managing availability was through the use of technologies.
Various information technologies were used to enable availability management. When
employees adopted and used these technologies, they automatically made themselves
available and accessible during work time.
The first mechanism was schedule sharing and it was embedded within the use of
the online calendar. The online calendar was linked to emails, so everyone got informed
by email when anyone within the group updated the calendar.
“We usually email back and forth, we keep a master calendar...You know,
Matthew is out. Kate will be gone from 2 until 4. Mary has a doctor appointment
from 9 to 10. Open emailing. We all share each other’s calendars.”Kevin, WLSG
team director
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The second control mechanism was presence awareness and it was embedded
within the use of the IM. The managers required the employees to adopt IM and that
employees indicate their presence through it.
“We use IM for… presence awareness. It means, OK, I am logging into IM and I
am on, and I will log in sometimes when I am sick, and I will say, ’out sick’. So
yeah, people know it, I am still in some level of access.” Mack, PDG team leader
The third control mechanism was “the follow-me phone number” embedded
within the use of mobile phone and phone forwarding technology. The employees could
route a phone number to whichever phone they were using at any moment so that they
could be reached anytime anywhere. For example, Cadee, PDG team member, worked in
her vacation home in Florida in winter away from her home in Massachusetts and still
was available thanks to using these technologies.
“Actually most of the people don’t know that I work in Florida for most of the
winter. You know, I have my cell phone, and my access line is forwarded to my
cell phone... You could call me and you think you are calling me in
Massachusetts.” Cadee, PDG team member
In summary, being available through information technologies was one of the
important behavior standards in telework. The managers managed the employees’
availability through role modeling, rules and protocols, and the control mechanisms were
embedded in the use of information technologies.
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5.2.2.3 Managing the Use of Information Technologies
Because the employees in these two groups were distributed in the telework
environment, they relied on information technologies to communicate and work, and
therefore the use of information technologies played an important role in the two teams.
Managers exercised behavioral control in the form of controlling the adoption and use of
these technologies. In this section, we primarily use the adoption and use of IM in PDG
team as an exemplar. The reason why we use IM instead of other technologies as
exemplar is because IM was more recently adopted than the other technologies such as
emails and follow-me-phones. The interviewees were better able to recall and elaborate
their experiences with the adoption and use of IM.
IM had multiple uses in the PDG group. It was used for indicating presence and
status, for facilitating quick conversations, for working as a supplemental communication
channel in teleconferences, and for other purposes.
“It (IM) is a presence indicator; it is absolute substitute for hall way
conversation; a post-it-’come see me or call me’-stick on the door;…it is the side
bar conversation during the meeting.” Diamond, PDG team member
The side bar conversation mentioned by Diamond meant private talks between
people sitting close to each other during a formal meeting. In a teleconference, everyone
was on the phone, making it impossible to carry on any private talks. With IM, people
could have side bar conversations during a teleconference.
The director in the PDG group made it clear to his group members that logging
into instant messenger was one of the behavior standards.
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“I don’t require them to come to the office, I don’t require them to punch a time
card, but I do require on any working day, they are on their instant messenger.
You put ‘I am gonna be on vacation’, or ’I am gonna be in a conference’, ’I am
traveling.’”Mack, PDG team director
People in PDG team had various attitudes toward using IM for work purposes.
Some of the team members had already adopted this technology in their personal lives,
and thus the transition for these people was relatively easy. But some people in the group
were reluctant to adopt the technologies for different reasons. Seely, PDG team member,
described this variation.
“I used IM previously with other friends, but started to use it with people in the
group a few months ago, which is now becoming more natural. There are people
who still don’t IM and it cannot be natural for them.” Seely, PDG team member
Due to the variation in attitudes toward using IM for work, the manager
constantly sent email reminders to the whole group stressing the importance of using IM.
Gradually, being on IM became the accepted behavior standard.
“Well, Mack had to tell us again and again and again, please use IM. It wasn’t
easy. Once he pushed us and pushed us, most of us came on IM.” Seely, PDG
team member
When people violated the behavior standard of using IM, they got “punishment”
for the violation. The same story about one person who refused to use instant messenger
and later got laid off was repeatedly told by several group members.
The adoption process took time, and the other soft rules about how the technology
should be used were gradually formed during the process of technology adoption. In the
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case of IM, people first adopted the technology, and then they formed the norm of
indicating their status on IM, which was a soft but not an explicit rule. Soft rules, which
are part of the clan control, will be discussed further in section about clan control. PDG
group member Seely described the process of adopting instant messenger in their group.
“In the first two months, we would not even be on IM. The next about three
months, not all of us login into IM everyday…This is the sixth month…, now all of
us are on IM. We still do not always show our status. For example, we go off for
lunch. We don’t change the status in IM. I would say it took us 5 months to
actually adopt it, and it will take another 2 months to come up with the right
norms on IM. When do you change status, you log out.” Seely, PDG team member
After IM was adopted, it became one of the mechanisms to manage availability of
the employees, as shown earlier in the availability management section. Mack, the group
director, started to rely on IM to manage people’s availability.
“As the day progresses across the country in particular, you know, Seely comes
on early in the morning, Cadee comes on early in the morning, Sage gets in early
because he is mountain time, and then Diana, and Belinda, and Chad comes on
west coast at different time. I know that now they are available. Mack, PDG team
director
5.2.3

Clan Control
Outcome and behavioral controls are categorized as formal control. Our data also

shows that informal controls, including clan control and self control, were exercised in
telework. The primary control mechanisms of clan control included employees’ selection
and promotion, corporate value internalization, trust building, and work norms.

70

5.2.3.1 Employee Selection and Promotion
Selecting and promoting qualified employees were control mechanisms in both
groups. The managers sought two sets of skills when hiring people. First, the managers
looked for employees with qualified professional skills. Second, the managers looked for
employees with qualities that would be suitable to work in telework environment. These
qualities include being highly self-motivated, being able to work independently, and
having good communication skills when working virtually.
The reasons why the managers looked for people with such qualities was because
they believed that in telework, it was necessary to minimize day-to-day monitoring and
supervision. They stressed the employees’ independence during work.
“I definitely have the right people…they are very independent, which is great. I
will continue to make sure whoever we bring in this group…have the same level
of independence.” Mack, PDG team director

5.2.3.2 Value Internalization
The

second

clan

control

mechanism

is

to

facilitate

employees’

value

internalization, meaning creating an environment so that the employees can understand
the company culture and the work process. Value internalization was mainly done
through employee socialization. For example, the WLSG team director asked the new
members to work in the office when they first joined the team.
“It was a year and half ago. I brought somebody in from another company. We
had them working on site for the first few weeks, I made arrangement so the
members of my team work in that location. (The new members) come in, sit with
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one member from the team…They spent the first 6 weeks to get oriented,
indoctrinated.” Kevin, WLSG team director
After the employees developed some understanding of the organization, then they
gradually went into telework mode.
"In our group, the first step is go flex, go flexible, come to the office for a couple
of days a week, work from home for a couple of days a week, but I don’t have
anybody join my group and go immediately work from home…You are going to
go in steps.” Kevin, WLSG team director
In this manner, the managers made arrangement to ensure the employees to go
through the process of value internalization before they went distributed.

5.2.3.3 Trust and Relationship Building
The managers stated that it was essential to maintain a higher level of trust in the
telework environment. The trust was both between managers and employees, and
between employees and other employees. Managers trusted that their employees would
work accountably even when out of sight. With a high level of trust, the managers did not
need to monitor or supervise employees at all times. The managers started out assuming
that the employees were trustworthy unless the employee violated the trust.
“If you cannot trust your folks, then you cannot work like this. If you are a
manager who has to see everybody everyday and that is what makes them work,
makes them productive. Then you couldn’t be able to work like this and you
shouldn’t try, because you are going to drive people insane and that include
yourself” Mack W, PDG team director
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The employees believed that trust and understanding between peers were also
important. The content of their work was interdependent, and higher levels of trust and
good relationships within the group helped them to finish the task more efficiently.
Because they did not want to damage the trust from the other people, they kept working
hard to maintain their reputations.
In this environment, the dominant trust building mechanism was based on
historical work performance. Because people were distributed and did not meet face-toface daily, people trusted other people based on the other person’s record of successful
completion of tasks on time.
“Your work becomes your face, because you are not going to meet them, and it
doesn’t matter how you drive, what you look like. All it matters is how you work.”
Seely, PDG team member
The trust based on historical work performance did not come right away when
new members joined the team. Trust building took time. The new members in a team
needed to work within the team to establish their reputations and gain the trust from their
peers. The new employee needed to build up trust with their work output over time.
“Roan is very new to the group, there is probably less trust there. We are
distributed, we haven’t seen his output yet. We haven’t seen him work before.
Kate probably has an easier entry just because we all have worked with her in the
past.” Matthew, WLSG team member
In addition, although the team only met face-to-face occasionally, face-to-face
group meetings were still powerful trust and relationship-building mechanisms. For
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example, WLSG team director, Kevin arranged travels for his group members to gather
the whole team together so that they had occasional face-to-face meetings.
“To find some way to draw them together to make up for their not bouncing (into)
each other in the hallways.” Kevin, WLSG team director
Moreover, communication technologies that enhanced the richness of the
communication also facilitated relationship building among distributed employees. One
example was the use of video cameras in PDG team. Employees in PDG team reported
that the use of video cameras enriched their online interactions. When a camera was used
in the teleconference, it enriched the communication by adding visual cues.
“We can facilitate the video conference.…. The expressions people make, when
certain jokes, certain news comes out, reveals a lot in the meeting. So somebody
says something about a specific project, and you see somebody frowning, it is
easy to key in on that person, to say, ’Hey, what is wrong? Is there something
wrong with the project we are proposing?’ versus, you are just on the phone, it
would just be a dead silence. You cannot really tell why it is a dead silence.”
Chad, PDG team member
When a video camera was used in one-on-one meetings between the
employee and the manager, it also brought value.
“When I have my one-on-one with Mack, it is pretty nice. Basically just seeing
him, him interacting with me, I feel more like cohesiveness. You know, I work for
this guy. I work for this company.” Chad, PDG team member
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5.2.3.4 Soft Rules
Another form of clan control was soft rules, which evolved in the process of
work. The distinction between soft rules and protocols was that the protocols were
specified by the manager, while the work norms were not explicitly specified by the
manager or other authorities, but were generated by the employees. Employees created
these soft rules because they made the work more efficient, and gradually these soft rules
regulated their work and became part of the clan control.
One example of soft rules was “overlap time”. Since people were distributed in
different time zones, they found that being available and accessible during the time when
all the people across time zones work was an efficient way to communicate, therefore the
“overlap time” became a soft rule.
“I work with people in Boston and Colorado...We scheduled all of our meeting
between 11am my time and about 3 o’clock my time, which is our common time. I
will make sure I am available at that time. Everyone else does that too. We know
we can pick up the phone and talk to somebody.” Seely, PDG team member
5.2.4

Self Control
The fourth form of control is self-control. In these two groups, people primarily

worked from home and away from their managers. Each person reported that they had
their own self management strategies to ensure work productivity.

5.2.4.1 Configuring Work Time
Some people configured their time to draw boundaries between work and
personal life. For example, Kate, WLSG team member, reserved peak time for work
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everyday and clearly defined the boundaries between work and life in order to work
productively.
“Typical work day for me is from 7:40 or 8 o’clock in the morning, and I typically
shut down at 5…. I have a family. I try very hard to stick to the 8-5 time period.
To get my job done in that time frame, I don’t spend time socializing and
networking with people because kids come home and then it is difficult to juggle
anything.” Kate, WLSG team member

5.2.4.2 Configuring Work Place
Some people configured their space to draw boundaries between work and
personal life. For example, Mary, WLSG team member, separated her work and personal
life space so that she could concentrate on work.
“I work primarily from SF office in TechCo. I don’t typically work at home
because I will lose concentration. I am just not very good at working at home, so I
come to the office everyday” Mary, WLSG team member

5.2.4.3 Optimally Utilizing Technologies
Information

technologies,

especially

the

mobile

and

wireless

technologies,

enabled the employees to work anytime anywhere. Some employees in telework
optimally utilized these technologies to better use their time. For example, when
Matthew, WLSG team member, moved to a new apartment and had no immediate
network access, he used his mobiles to conduct work.
“This morning, I was doing most of my emails on my phone. One (email on my
way) from the apartment I’m living in at the moment to a nearby coffee shop.
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(Then I) had a meeting there, and did a bunch of more work there, you know,
downloading some files, and now I am actually back at the apartment, talking to
you on the cell phone and working offline of my laptop, and I will switch
somewhere to log back in and send a bunch of stuff later, or just connect to my
phone and send them over my phone that way.” Matthew, WLSG team member
The use of mobile technologies also helped the employees to balance their work
and personal life. Kevin, WLSG team director recalled an occasion that he was able to
integrate his work and personal life activities.
“I was in a softball championship last week to be with my daughter. Great thing
is I can work from the softball field. Because I spent my time on the phone…I
have a calendar on it, I have a laptop and I keep everything loaded. When I got
there, I just need to find a spot and kick and go, and take a few phone calls and
have a discussion with somebody.” Kevin, WLSG team director
In summary, employees exercised self-control strategies by configuring their
work time and work space, and utilizing the mobile technologies to ensure their work
productivities.
5.2.5

Summary of the Results
To summarize, I identified four types of organizational controls in

these two

teams that I studied. For each type of control, I identified its control mechanisms. Table 2
shows the control type, control mechanism, and the examples from these two teams.
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Table 2: Control Mechanisms of Four Forms of Controls in Telework
Control
Forms

Control
Mechanisms

Deliverable Focus

Organizational-level policies about
goal setting and performance
evaluation based on goals
The middle-level managers focus on
specifying deliverables of work and
monitor the timeliness and quality of
the deliverables

Checkpoints

It refers to the points in time on
which the employees will provide
status update of the work.
Checkpoints can be initiated by both
the managers or the employees.

Rules and
Protocols

Guidelines and procedures about
how to maintain availability, how to
use technologies and how to conduct
work.

Availability
Management

Mechanisms to ensure the
employees are available and
accessible although away from
company and the managers.

Managing the Use
of Information
Technologies

The managers control the
employees' behaviors about
adoption and use of information
technologies.

Goal Setting
Process

Outcome
Controls

Behavior
Controls

Definition

Illustrated Quotations
“……I don’t mind if they spend 8 o’clock in the morning to 6 o’clock in
the night working, or 8 o’clock to 6 o’clock in the zoo, as long as they
meet their goals and don’t’ miss the deadline.” Kevin, WLSG team
director
“They (the deliverables) can be very simplistic such as the physical
design standards, or the functional requirements for technologies to
support open work, they are written documents….” Mack, PDG team
leader.
“Since I have been working from home… I’ve started to make sure I
work proactive in communicating, just to my own boss, what I am
working on, what is my status, what I am doing. Even if it is good, even
it is I am on track. If it is due in two weeks, one week has expired, I’ve
done a week worth. I have one week left. I will tell him that, so he
knows.” Sage, PDG team member
“We try to have some sort of protocols, who can and who cannot
update something. At the beginning of the project, we are going to
define, OK. You are someone who is going to update stuff. You are in
charge of the specific part of the project. So you are in charge of these
sets of documents.” Chad, PDG team member.
“We use IM for… presence awareness. It means, OK, I am logging into
IM and I am on, and I will log in sometimes when I am sick, and I will
say, ’out sick’. So yeah, people know it, I am still in some level of
access…” Mack, PDG team leader
“I don’t require them to come to the office, I don’t require them to
punch a time card, but I do require on any working day, they are on
their instant messenger. You put ‘I am gonna be on vacation’, or ’I am
gonna be in a conference’, ’I am traveling.’…”Mack, PDG team
director
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Clan
Controls

Self
Controls

Employee
Selection and
Promotion

Selecting and promoting the
employees that have both
credentials for the work and
qualities to work in telework
environment

Value
Internalization

The managers facilitate the new
employees to understand telework
culture and work process

Trust and
Relationship
Building

building trust between the managers
and the employees, and between
employees.

Work Norms

implicit soft rules that are created
during the work process

Configuring work
time

configure time between work and
personal life so as to work
productively

Configuring work
place

configure space between work and
personal life so as to work
productively

Optimally using
information
technologies

Use information technologies to
balance work and personal life

“I definitely have the right people…they are very independent, which is
great. I will continue to make sure whoever we bring in this
group…have the same level of independence.” Mack, PDG team
director
“It was a year and half ago. I brought somebody in from another
company. We had them working on site for the first few weeks, I made
arrangement so the members of my team work in that location. (The
new members) come in, sit with one member from the team…They
spent the first 6 weeks to get oriented, indoctrinated…,” Kevin, WLSG
team director
“Roan is very new to the group, there is probably less trust there. We
are distributed, we haven’t seen his output yet. We haven’t seen him
work before. Kate probably has an easier entry just because we all
have worked with her in the past.” Matthew, WLSG team member
“I work with people in Boston and Colorado...We scheduled all of our
meeting between 11am my time and about 3 o’clock my time, which is
our common time. I will make sure I am available at that time.
Everyone else does that too. We know we can pick up the phone and
talk to somebody.” Seely, PDG team member
“Typical work day for me is from 7: 40 or 8 o’clock in the morning,
and I typically shut down at 5…. I have a family. I try very hard to stick
to the 8-5 time period. To get my job done in that time frame, I don’t
spend time socializing and networking with people because kids come
home and then it is difficult to juggle anything.” Kate, WLSG team
member
“I work primarily from San Francisco office in TechCo. I don’t
typically work at home because I will lose concentration. I am just not
very good at working at home, so I come to the office everyday...”
Mary, WLSG team member
“I was in softball championship last week to be with my daughter.
Great thing is I can work from the softball field. Because I spent my
time on the phone…I have a calendar on it, I have a laptop and I keep
everything loaded. when I got there, I just need to find a spot kick and
go, and take a few phone calls and have a discussion with
somebody…” Kevin, WLSG team director
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6

Discussion
Controls in the Telework Environment

6.1

In my research site, the employees were distributed and worked from home away
from their managers during the majority of their work time. This situation did not liberate
them from managerial controls. Instead, my data showed that these employees were
subject to all four forms of controls (outcome, behavioral, self, and clan control)
identified in the prior literatures in controls. Each control had its detailed control
mechanisms and these controls operated together to form a control portfolio in the
telework environment.
6.1.1

Outcome Control

The data showed that the managers exercised outcome controls in telework. I
identified three outcome control mechanisms, including goal setting process, focus on
deliverable, and checkpoints. According to prior studies on the contingency conditions to
apply outcome control, outcome controls are suitable when outcome measurability is high
(Ouchi 1979; Eisenhardt 1985; Kirsch 1996; Hatch 1997 ). Meanwhile, my data
identified three concerns about applying outcome controls in our research site: 1) The
interpersonal interactions could not be captured in outcome control, 2) research work
involved risks and uncertainties, and 3) the output of the research work could only be
measured subjectively. Due to the first and third concerns, the outcome measurability was
not very high in the research site. However, the data showed that the managers still
applied and stressed the importance of outcome controls despite the low level of outcome
measurability. This contradicts the expectations of prior theories (Ouchi 1979; Eisenhardt
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1985) and empirical studies (Kirsch 1996) on contingency conditions for outcome
control.
An in-depth analysis of my data revealed that the managers addressed this problem by
first making efforts to enhance measurability. They established clear and measurable
goals and focused on tangible deliverables. Moreover, the managers established the
checkpoints for status updates phase by phase so that the work was recognized even if the
research work could not make an immediate impact. More importantly, the managers
concurrently applied other forms of control to address issues that outcome controls alone
could not address.
Interestingly, the managers perceived that outcome control was the dominant form of
control in telework. During the interviews, the managers explicitly answered that they
“manage by results”. They also perceived that outcome controls could replace behavior
controls. They made comments about how they did not care how their employee spent
their day as long as outcomes were delivered. However, they contradicted themselves
with comments about how they required their employees to stay available through
technologies.
6.1.2

Behavioral Control
The data showed that behavioral controls were exercised in the telework

environment. The managers stressed that they had rules and protocols to manage the
employees. The control mechanisms included availability management and the use of
information technologies. Prior studies on contingency conditions of control forms
conclude that high level of behavior observability leads to behavior control (Kirsch
1996), (Kirsch 1996; Hatch 1997; Eisenhardt 1985) because when it is easy to observe
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behaviors, the cost associated with behavior control is low (Eisenhardt 1985). In
telework, employees are distributed and managers are remote, making it difficult if not
impossible to observe employees’ behaviors on a daily basis in the traditional way.
Therefore, traditional behavior controls are not suitable in this environment.
The data show that behavior controls did exist but they were distinct from
traditional behavior controls. The managers no longer focused on monitoring the
employees’ behaviors in the office-based setting, but rather shifted to monitoring
employees’ availability through technologies and their behaviors of adopting and using
technologies in their work. For example, our findings showed that managers used various
mechanisms to ensure the employees’ availability. Being available through information
technologies had become the new behavior standard. The data also showed that the
managers mandated their employees to adopt and use instant messenger and exercised
punishment when people deviated from the behavior standards. The reasons why the
managers in telework focus on these new sets of behaviors are twofold. First, in this
environment people heavily rely on information technologies to work and communicate.
Second, some aspects of the behaviors about availability and about the adoption and use
of information technologies can be easily detected. Taking the use of instant messenger
as an example, the managers could detect whether the employees used instant messenger
from the managers’ own home.
The concept of availability management in telework is aligned with the notion of
“disciplinary power” theorized by Foucault (Foucault 1979). In disciplinary power,
control is exercised in indirect and subtle ways and people who are controlled experience
“compulsive visibility”, meaning that at any given time, the people who are being
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controlled can potentially be “visible” to the people who control, although power is not
exercised at all times. In telework, thanks to the use of information technologies,
especially the use of mobile phones and accessline technologies, the employees can be
expected to be available anytime anywhere. Although the managers do not monitor
employees’ availability at all times, employees know that they could be monitored at any
time. Despite the literature on the adverse consequences of disciplinary control (Jackson,
Gharavi and Klobas 206), our data did not reveal any adverse reactions from the
employees.
Interestingly, the managers perceived behavioral control as a costly way to control
and frequently said that they did not care about employees’ behaviors as long as outputs
were produced. Often, they immediately contradicted themselves by stating how they
cared deeply about employees’ availability and behaviors using technologies. The
reasons behind the managers’ self-contradictions on behavior controls might be because
the managers still think of behavior controls in the traditional office-based setting but
have not realized that managing availability and use of technologies are the new forms of
behavioral control in the telework environment.
6.1.3

Clan Control
My data showed that clan control is part of the control portfolio in the telework

environment. According to control theories (Ouchi 1980; Hatch 1997), clan control is
suitable when environments are complex and rapidly changing, uncertainty and
ambiguity are consequently high, and surveillance is difficult because of limited
understanding of behavior and outputs. My research site fit this profile of organizational
environment and task characteristics for clan controls. However, Ouchi’s theory (Ouchi
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1979; Ouchi 1980) implies that clan control will replace formal behavioral and outcome
controls. Clan control is considered to be an informal substitute for formal control
systems (Robey and Sales 1994). Our findings contradict this idea by showing that clan
control complemented and coexisted with two forms of formal control. I found that the
managers

still

applied

outcome

controls

although

the

environmental

and

task

characteristics were imperfect for this type of control because they concurrently applied
clan control, especially trust, which addressed the limitations of outcome controls.
I identified four clan control mechanisms including employee selection and
promotion, value internalization, trust and relationship building, and work norms. These
control mechanisms are common clan control mechanisms identified or theorized in prior
control studies (Ouchi 1979; Ouchi 1980). Trust is one of the most important clan control
mechanisms. I found that the trust building mechanism was primarily based on historical
work performance in telework. Adler (2001) theorizes that trust in the knowledge
economy is reflective trust rather than blind trust. Norms play a central role and trust is
grounded in open dialogue among peers. Reflective trust emphasizes integrity and
competency. My data showed that people became trustworthy when they demonstrated
competency, which was shown through their quality work product.
6.1.4

Self Control
Self-control is the other informal control besides clan control. My data showed

that self control was part of the control portfolio in the telework environment. For
example, the employees often disciplined themselves to work in a particular place so that
they could concentrate better on work although they were free to work anytime
anywhere. These self-control strategies belong to the self-management technique of
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environmental planning (Manz 1986), referring to changing factors in the environment so
that positive behaviors are more likely to occur. In this environment, employees are given
the flexibility to configure their own work time. I found that teleworkers used various
strategies to configure their time. Some blended work and personal time, while others set
clear boundaries between work and personal time. The goal was to work productively.
Thus, time management is an important self-control mechanism. Moreover, mobile
technologies such as PDA, cell phone, and laptop are important technologies for telework
employees. I found that the telework employees utilized mobile technologies to make
better use of their time and balance their work and personal life activities.
My data showed another type of self-control, employee-initiated control, which
both relates to and differs from the concept of self control identified in prior literature.
Employee initiated controls refer to the phenomenon that the employees take initiative to
report to their managers about their work status although it is not required by the
managers. Employee-initiated control is similar to traditional self controls in the sense
that that both of them are initiated by the employees and not imposed by managers. They
are distinct in the sense that the whole process of traditional self control does not involve
the manager while employee initiated control involves both the manager and the
employee. Both of these controls serve the purpose of ensuring that people work
responsibly. However, the driver of the employee-initiated control is that employees
desire to gain visibility.
In my research site, the employees considered it important for their managers to
understand the value of their work, so they constantly reminded their managers about
their work status. Although the employees did not conduct self-reporting for the purpose
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of control, this behavior serves the purpose of control in effect. Because employees take
initiative to report status with the managers, it increases the frequency of performance
monitoring, which is an important component in control design (Robey and Sales 1994)
Interestingly, the actions of the employee, people who are being controlled, actually have
altered the design of control.
This situation is similar to the notion of dialectic of control proposed by Giddens
(1979). Due to human agency, Giddens (1979) theorized that in a relationship of power
and control, the one being controlled can also affect control. However, Giddens further
explained agency from the perspective that the ones being controlled have autonomy to
distance themselves from control. In my study, it is the opposite. The employees being
controlled take initiative to report, showing that they are subjecting themselves to even
tighter control. In my data, the employees took initiatives to provide status update reports
to their managers although they were not asked to do so. These behaviors increased the
frequency of monitoring, making the employees subject to tighter control.
6.1.5

Control Portfolio
My data showed that all four different controls (outcome, behavior, clan, self

controls) operated together in the telework environment. Each control form had its own
control mechanisms, and the four different forms of controls formed a control portfolio.
The idea of control portfolio has been studied in the context of information systems
development. Henderson and Lee (1992) conclude that the effects of different controls
are additive and that the combination of behavior control from management and outcome
control from team members contributes to better performance. Kirsch and her colleagues
conducted a series of studies on the issue of control portfolio in the context of
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information systems development, studying the antecedent conditions that determine the
form of controls in the control portfolio (Kirsch 1996), how controls are exercised, and
why the managers structure the portfolio of control modes as they do (Kirsch 1997).
Other research examines how stakeholders exercise controls during different phases of
large IS projects (Kohli and Kettinger 2004). These studies are conducted in the context
of information systems development while my study is in the context of telework.
Although the study contexts are different, we both found that there exists a control
portfolio consisting of different types of controls rather than just a single form of control.
In addition, Kirsch emphasizes the antecedent factors that lead to the particular
components in the control portfolio.
I found that some controls still exist in the control portfolio even under the
condition that the environmental factors and task characteristics are imperfect for these
controls. For example, I identified some concerns associated with applying outcome
controls in my research site. However, my data showed that outcome control still played
an important role in the work environment. This phenomenon seemingly contradicts the
prior control theories that specify contingency conditions for specific types of control.
However, a close examination of the data by regarding the control portfolio as a
whole can resolve this contradiction. In financial terms, investment portfolios consist of
multiple investments because the investments within the portfolio complement each
other. The control portfolio works in the same way. In my data, when the manager stated
that they “managed by results” (outcome control), they always followed it by saying that
their employees were readily available through information technologies (behavior
control), and they highly trusted their employees (clan control). It showed that the
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managers primarily relied on the outcome control. However, availability management
ensured that issues that occurred between the outcome check points could be easily
resolved, and that trust can cover the subjective part of the work that cannot be addressed
by outcome control. Meanwhile, self control deals with employees’ everyday work.
Therefore, the four different control forms operate together and complement each other.
This explains the apparent contradiction that even where antecedent conditions for
outcome control are not present, this control still operates well in this environment. It is
because other forms of control within the portfolio complement it.
Cardinal, Sitkin et al (Cardinal, Sitkin et al. 2004) (2004) studied the dynamics of
control over time and concluded that the imbalance between formal and informal control
triggers control change and the balance between formal and informal controls leads to
organization effectiveness. Although my study is cross-sectional, I observed a control
portfolio

in

which

formal

control and informal control operated together and

complemented each other. One example is that the employees reported to their managers
about their work status although it was not required by the managers. Because of self
reporting, the managers could track the employees’ work output without directly asking
or monitoring the employees. In this sense, the employee initiated control strengthened
outcome controls.
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Figure 1: Control Portfolios for Telework in TechCo.
6.2

The Role of the Use of Instant Messenger in Organizational Controls
The data showed that the employees in telework heavily relied on information

technologies to work and to communicate. Since using technologies became an important
part of work practices, the adoption and use of information technologies was highly
related to managerial controls, especially behavioral control.
First, I argue that control over the adoption and use of technologies is a new form
of behavioral control in telework. Whether the employees adopted particular information
technologies and how the employees used the technologies after adoption are part of
work behaviors. The managers can make behavior standards, monitor this behavior, and
correct the behaviors if there are deviations. For example, the PDG group manager
clearly mandated the team members to adopt instant messenger. The managers in both
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LSG and PDG group asked their employees to use, update, and share a public calendar.
This phenomenon can be categorized as behavioral control.
Some people speculate that in telework, the cost of monitoring behaviors of the
employees is high because of the physical distance between the managers and the
employees. However, my findings showed that the use of information technologies
enhances the behavior observability and thus makes it possible to exercise behavior
controls in a telework work environment. The information about the usage of
technologies can be easily obtained even in telework. For example, for remote managers,
it is easy to see from somebody’s email response timeliness or appearance on instant
messenger, whereas watching somebody work in their home is practically impossible.
Moreover, when employees use information technologies, they are subject to controls
embedded in the technologies. For example, public calendar, follow-me-phone, and
instant messenger were used to make the employees highly available, and the use of such
technologies was an important mechanism in availability management in TechCo.
There are some prior studies in the field of information systems on the controls
and the use of information technologies. Orlikowski (1991) found that the CASE tool use
intensified controls on knowledge workers because the employees have to follow the
work process embedded in the CASE tool. Coombs, Knights et al. (1992) found that after
the adoption of information systems, physicians became dependent on the computermediated practices and they were more strongly managed by organizational controls. The
technologies studied in Orlikowski (1991) and Coombs, Knights et al. (1992) are CASE
tools and medical information systems. These technologies directly aid the work practice.
They enforce people to work in a certain way with embedded work process. The
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technologies that I studied, by contrast, are communication technologies, and they do not
enforce a way of working. My findings agree with the idea that there are controls
embedded within a particular information technology but my data also showed that
control over the use of information technologies differs from the control embedded
within the information technologies.
Take the adoption and use of instant messenger in PDG group as an example. The
data showed a process by which instant messenger became implicated in control. First,
the manager promoted and enforced the adoption of the technology. The PDG group
director said that he forced his team members to use instant messenger. He regularly sent
email messages to remind them to log into the instant messenger, and even punished
people who refused to do so. This is the control over the use of information technologies.
The manager’s goal was to eventually use instant messenger to manage people’s
availability. Second, the employees gradually adopted the technology. In this case, after
several months, nearly all people who stayed in the group logged into the instant
messenger everyday. Third, people started to develop norms about using the technology
in their everyday life. In PDG group, the employees developed a soft rule to indicate their
status on instant messenger. Fourth, the controls embedded within the technologies made
the use of information technologies become a control mechanism. In this case, the
managers use presence awareness as a control mechanism to ensure availability of the
employees.
In summary, it is clear that there are two types of controls involved around the use
of information technologies. The first is the control over employees’ the use, and the
second is the control embedded in the technologies. (Orlikowski 1991) differentiates two

91

types of controls: personal controls and systemic controls. Personal controls are controls
exercised from people on people; systemic controls are controls embedded within
information technologies and thus are not exercised through personal interaction but
through the adoption and use of these technologies. Of the two types of controls I
identified in my study, the control over the use of technologies belongs to personal
control, and the control embedded in the technologies belongs to the systemic control.
The process illustrated in Figure 2 is a process that transforms the personal controls to
systemic controls.

Figure 2: The role of the use of information technologies in organizational
controls
The controls embedded within CASE tool in Orlikowski’s study and the controls
embedded within the instant messenger in my study are slightly different. For the CASE
tool, work processes of IT design are embedded within the technology. When designers
use the CASE tool, they are forced to follow the embedded work processes. For the
instant messenger, the IT artifact provides some general features. For example, a sentence
can be written under the users’ names after the users log into the instant messenger.
These features of instant messengers restrict and or enable the uses of the technology, but
they do not constitute work processes. During the process of using the instant messenger
technology, PDG group gradually formed a soft rule that the team members should write
down their current status, such as “out for lunch”, or “Dr. appointment 1-3PM”. The
members in the PDG group called this rule “presence awareness”, and it was used to
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control people’s availability. Therefore, the controls were embedded within the instant
messenger during the use process. The combination of the technological features that the
IT designers provide and the soft rule that people create embeds the control. I argue that
the controls are transformed to systemic control because, after the technologies are
adopted and the rules are formed, the director can control people’s availability through
their use of the instant messenger without directly and personally interacting with them.

7

Conclusion
I conducted a qualitative study exploring the issue of managerial controls in the

telework environment. Based on the data collected through qualitative interviews and
analyzed following the grounded theory methodologies, I developed a theoretical account
on the issue of managerial controls in the context of telework. I found that rather than
relying on a particular control form or a dominant subset of control forms, the managers
in telework applied a portfolio of controls that included all four different controls
identified in the prior control theories. Each form of control had its own control
mechanisms, and different forms of controls had complementary effects and formed a
control portfolio. In addition, I found that controlling how employees adopt and use
information technologies in their work represents a new form of behavior control that is
adapted to the telework environment.
This study is not without limitations. First, the two teams that participated in the
study were responsible for supporting the telework environment for their company. The
nature of their work made them tend to have favorable attitudes toward telework and
managerial controls within Telework, and thus their views may not be representative of
all types of teleworkers. However, using these teams in our study served the purpose of
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revealing the phenomenon being studied clearly, and thus the selection of these two
teams fulfilled the guideline of theoretical sampling within grounded theory. Second, the
two teams participating in the study are all stable teams, and my study takes a crosssectional design. Managerial controls are very likely to be different in different phases of
the teams. The dynamics of controls in different phase of the team are not captured within
the study. Third, we rely on interview data as the primary data source. Observation data
would be helpful to further enrich the data. However, since the study participants are
distributed and work in their private space, it is not feasible to obtain observation data.
The results of my study have implications for both research and practice. I
developed a theoretical account about how organizations exercise controls in a telework
environment and explained the role of using information technologies in organizational
controls. My first contribution is that we further elaborate control theories for telework
environment by identifying control mechanisms for different forms of controls. Second, I
further extend the control theories by redefining behavioral controls in telework. In
Telework, the managers and the employees are remote from each other, and the managers
cannot personally or directly monitor the employees’ behaviors. However, they can track
their use of information technologies in their work. Therefore, controlling the behaviors
of using technologies is also a form of behavior controls, which have not been identified
before. Third, I further clarify the difference between controlling how employees use
information technologies and controls embedded within information technologies. The
former refers to managerial controls exercised to influence the employees’ behaviors of
adoption and use of information technologies. The latter means that specific work
processes are embedded in the design of information technologies, and thus the
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employees’ behaviors are restricted or controlled when they use these technologies in
their work practices.
The results of my study are of great potential value to managers of telework. One
of the resistance factors of telework comes from the middle-level managers, who believe
that it is difficult to manage employees who do not work on site. The results of my study
showed that actually all four different types of control can operate within telework
environment, and that each type of control has detailed control mechanisms. When the
managers are informed about the different types of controls operating in the telework
environment, they will be more confident about their management and have less
resistance to telework. Second, the managers should understand that it is a portfolio of
controls that operate together, and that different forms of control may complement each
other. Managers should choose from the large pool of control mechanisms and assemble
their own control portfolios that are suitable for their organizations. Third, managers
should acknowledge the importance of the use of information technologies in telework.
Managers should shift their mindset about the notion of behavior control. Managing by
walking around is no longer possible in telework environment, but that does not mean
that behavior controls cannot operate. Controlling the use of technologies is the new form
of behavior controls in this new work environment.
In my research, the employees worked at home for majority of their work time,
and all group members within the team were teleworkers. For future research, first, it
would be worthwhile to investigate the difference between controls on full-time
teleworkers and controls on part-time teleworkers. For example, the difference between
controls in teams that consist of teleworkers only and controls in teams that consist of
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both teleworkers and the office-based workers could be investigated. A second research
avenue would be to conduct longitudinal research to develop a process theory of how
organizational controls evolve in a distributed team. My data show that "soft rules"
evolved within teleworking teams, but a more extended study of controls over time
should reveal a clearer picture of the evolution of the entire control portfolio. Third,
teleworkers adopt a variety of information technologies such as online collaboration tools
and wireless devices, and thus more studies are needed to explore the impact of different
information technologies on organizational controls in the telework environment.
Hopefully, as telework workforces grow, the results of my research, as well as those
of future research can update control theory and inform the practitioners to successfully
manage telework.
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Appendix 1: The list of the initial codes
Below is the list of codes that were developed based literature review on control theories.
•

•

Technology Use
o Email Use
o Instant Messenger Use
o Mobile Phone Use
o Video Use
o Collaboration Technology Use
Controls
o Assumption of controls: The assumption of controls is that people have
diverse goals and interests. They might be incongruent with organization’s
goals. Controls are needed to ensure people to work towards
organization’s goals.
• Behavioral control
o Setting behavioral standards
o Monitor behaviors
o Performance evaluation based on behaviors
o Give feedback about behaviors
o Task observarability: conditions to exercise control. Whether tasks can be
easily observed
•

Outcome control
o Setting outcome standards
o Monitor outcomes
o Performance evaluation based on output
o Give feedback about output
o Task measurability
o Task easy to be associated with individuals or groups

•

Agency theory constructs
o Contract: Principle specify measures and promise rewards to agents in
contracts to align principle’s and agent’s interests
o Shirk: Agents act for their own interests when not being observed by
principals.
o Interests incongruence: difference between principal’s and agents’
interests
o Delegate: Principals allow agents to act on their behalf.
o Cost of control: the costs associated with collecting the information
required to minimize the chance that the agents will shirk
o Surveillance mechanisms
o Information systems

97

•

Three sources of control
o Market control: use price competition as a control mechanism
o Bureaucracy control: rules, procedures, documentations, and
surveillance as control
o Clan control: Organizations that implementve clan mechanisms
facilitate their employees to obtain high internal commitment to the
firm’s objective, cultures, norms, and values mainly through the
employee selection, promotion, and socialization processes.
o Cost of selecting employing
o Cost of surveillance and monitoring

•

Self-control
o Set up standards by oneself
o Self Monitor behaviors
o Self Evaluate
o Self reward
o Environmental planning: referring to changing factors in the environment
so that positive behaviors are more likely to occur
o Behavioral programming: referring to rewarding or correcting oneself
based on performance
§ self-observation: systematic data gathering about one’s own
behavior in order to establish the basis for self-evaluation
§ specifying goals: specifying goals publicly can be particularly
effective
§ cueing strategies: limiting environmental factors that lead to
undesirable behavior while increasing those evoking desirable
behavior
§ incentive modification: self-reward and self-punishment, and
§ rehearsal: systematic practice of a desired performance
§ Self-leadership: recognizes the importance of intrinsic motivations,
the rewards that result from performing the activities themselves

•

Clan control
o Forming Normas
o Internalize values
o Employee Selection
o Employee Promotion
o Employee Socialization
o Trust as control
o Reflective trust

•

Concertive control
o Consensus of appropriate behaviors
o Value-based discourse
o negotiated consensus
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•

Formal controls

•

Informal controls

•
•
•
•

Disciplinary power
Compulsive visibility
Power’s invisibility
Dialectic of controls: power relations, are always two-way.
• Employee initiated control
• Written rules versus rules in reality
Control portfolios
Control mechanisms

•
•
•

Strauss & Corbin analysis paradigm
o Conditions
o Actions/Interactions
o Consequences
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Appendix 2: The list of the final codes used in the data analyses
Context codes
1. WLSG group
2. PDG group
3. long distance work relationships
4. Telework Support Program
5. personal background
6. work contents
7. Tech. Co. telework culture
Technology use codes
1. access line use
1. cell phone use
2. email use
3. IM adoption
4. IM use
5. mandate use of technology
6. online calendar use
7. online collaboration tool use
8. technology adoption
9. technology resistance
10. technology use
11. laptop use
12. phone use

Control codes
13. availability management
14. behavioral control
15. check points
16. clan control
17. Deliverables
18. desire for face time
19. employee socialization
20. employee autonomy
21. employee initiated control
22. employee selection
23. employee work motivations
24. goal setting
25. individual flexibility
26. internalize value
27. Issues with outcome control
28. lack of informal encounters
29. level plain field
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30. long working hours
31. management assumption
32. manager's own experience
33. motivate employees
34. nature of the work
35. the negatives of telework
36. organizational policy
37. outcome control
38. output criterion
39. peer pressure
40. performance evaluation
41. personal skill development
42. proactive communication
43. productivity
44. reasons being remote
45. relationship building
46. remote delay
47. remote management challenge
48. resistance to telework
49. rules and protocols
50. self control
51. Self motivated
52. self perceived productivity
53. social element
54. strategic check-in
55. team performance
56. trust building
57. uncertainty of the work
58. video technology use
59. visibility
60. work life balance
61. work norm
62. work space
63. work time
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